On cross-examination, Cruz admitted that he lied to the police in his initial statements. He had falsely identified Lujan as Ybarra's killer because he was afraid that appellant might place a hit on him. He also had falsely stated that Lujan had bragged about the killing. And he had made several false statements regarding his role in the offense and what happened afterwards.

Moses Bazan survived the attack and testified at trial. According to Bazan, he and Ybarra occupied room 15 of the New Laredo Motel on March 18 and 19, 1998. Bazan testified that Ybarra was scared and nervous that week and did not want to be alone. On the evening of the 18th, Bazan encountered Cruz, Lujan, and appellant in the parking lot at various points in time. At 9:00 p.m. Bazan used some cocaine. Ybarra drank a couple of beers and went to bed. Bazan went to bed after midnight.

During the robbery, Bazan saw the conspirators gathering valuables. At some point, after being stabbed numerous times, Bazan decided to play dead and rolled his eyes back into his head so that only the whites were showing. He heard a conversation in which someone said they should cut Bazan into pieces and throw him into the lake. However, the men were having difficulty moving Bazan, and one of them said "Let's get out of here. We've been here too long." Bazan lost consciousness at least twice during the robbery, once at the very end. He subsequently awoke at 7:00 or 8:00 a.m., untied himself, went to the motel manager's office, and asked the manager to call 911.

On cross-examination, Bazan testified that there was a fourth robber. He also testified, however, that he had previously expressed some uncertainty to the police on whether there was a fourth person. On redirect, he testified that he had never identified a fourth person as one of the robbers but he was sure of the three he had identified.

Detective Chavarria testified as an expert on the Mexican Mafia. He talked about their practice of collecting the "dime," a ten percent tax on illegal drugs, and he identified the tattoo on appellant's chest as signifying appellant's membership in the organization.

Amalia Garcia testified that she was present in room 20 on March 18^th. She saw appellant, Cruz, and Lujan leave with bandannas and motel towels. Before they left, she heard one of them say "Let's go get her" or "Let's go get" someone, and she saw appellant ask Michelle Rodriguez for her car keys. On the morning of the 19^th, Garcia was taken to the police station and questioned. When asked who rented the motel room, she made up some names because she did not want others to know she had told the police anything. Later that day, she went to George Martinez's house, where she saw appellant and also saw towel rags full of blood.

In the State's case-in-chief, Michelle Rodriguez testified that appellant had rented room 20. She also testified that appellant borrowed her car keys on March 18^th and that the car had not been returned by the time the police came to the motel room on the 19^th. When appellant borrowed the keys, he was wearing blue jeans and a T-shirt. In the defense's case-in-chief, she testified that appellant drove with her to the hospital on the evening of March 19, 1998. A hospital record showed that they were there at 6:56 p.m. She also testified that, when she arrived at Martinez's house on the afternoon of the 19^th, her car was there, but she did not see appellant, who arrived later. She also did not see any blood or injuries on appellant. She lent her car to Cruz on the 20^th, and she signed a consent to search form for her car on the 21^st, after Cruz had been arrested.

According to several San Antonio police officers, the police were called at around 8:30 a.m. concerning the incident in question. There were socks tied around Bazan's legs, a shirt around his ankles, and a clothesline wire around his neck. DNA testing was conducted on clothes found in the trunk of Rodriguez's car. Bazan could not be excluded as a contributor to a bloody shirt and jacket found there. Appellant could not be excluded as a contributor to blood found on a pair of shorts in that same location. DNA testing under Ybarra's fingernails excluded appellant and Lujan as the source of DNA but were inconclusive as to Cruz's DNA. Medical testimony indicated that Ybarra's death resulted from strangulation by a ligature (i.e. a cord-like object).

The manager of the New Laredo Motel testified for the state regarding the days various rooms were rented and to whom. On cross-examination, he testified that, on March 19, 1998, the people in room 16 checked out at about 7:45 a.m.

Mercedes Villarreal testified for the defense as an alibi witness. She had been involved in an extramarital romantic relationship with appellant. She was reluctant to testify because she had not wanted her husband to discover the affair. According to Villarreal, appellant called her between 5:30 and 6:00 a.m. on March 19, 1998. He asked her to pick him up at the Easy Shop, a store that was half a block away from the New Laredo Motel. She picked appellant up between 6:30 and 6:45 a.m. (before taking her children to school) and took him back to her house. He was wearing jeans, tennis shoes, a T-shirt, and a cap, and she saw no injuries or blood on him. Later, she saw news of the robbery and murder on television and went back to her home, where she found appellant asleep. At around 6:00 p.m., she took appellant to the Martinez home. Villarreal also testified that she had visited appellant twice in jail since he was arrested for the crime, and she acknowledged appellant's membership in the Mexican Mafia.

As a State's rebuttal witness, Detective Chavarria testified that Galvan is a member of the Mexican Mafia and that Galvan had signed a TDC form admitting that he was a member.

Dr. Garriott testified for the defense about the effects of drug consumption on perception. He testified that cocaine can adversely affect perception, cause hallucinations, and cause someone to have a psychotic episode. Someone using cocaine can forget things that happened and "remember" other things that did not happen. A cocaine user can also seriously misjudge the passage of time. He also testified that marijuana and heroin use can alter a person's perception of events. On cross-examination, he conceded that, if a person injected a small amount of cocaine at 9:00 in the evening, he would not still be feeling the effects of that cocaine at 6:00 the next morning.

In point of error two, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. His claim concerns three categories of sufficiency: accomplice witness corroboration, legal sufficiency, and factual sufficiency.

The following non-accomplice evidence tends to connect appellant to the offense:

(1) Moses Bazan testified that appellant was one of the robbers, that he was Ybarra's primary assailant, that he hit Ybarra numerous times, and that he was hitting Ybarra when she uttered her last cry before she died.

(2) Amalia Garcia testified that appellant was with Cruz and Lujan and that one of them said "Let's go get her" or "Let's go get" someone.

(3) Garcia and Michelle Rodriguez testified that appellant borrowed Rodriguez's car keys on the evening before the murder. Clothes with Bazan's blood on them were found in the trunk of Rodriguez's car.

The requirements of the accomplice witness rule were satisfied.

As for appellant's claim that Bazan did not actually see appellant strangle the victim, the State did not have to prove that appellant personally killed Ybarra. The jury was charged on the law of parties, and Bazan's testimony was more than sufficient to establish appellant's guilt as a party. Even so, Bazan did testify that appellant was the only person around Ybarra when she cried out the last time before she died and that appellant was assaulting her at the time.

Second, appellant claims that Cruz was the sole witness to articulate the "el dime" motive for the crime. Appellant is incorrect. Cruz's testimony is the only direct evidence of that motive, but the testimony of several other witnesses combined gives circumstantial support for that motive. Other witnesses testified that appellant was a member of the Mexican Mafia. And Detective Chavarria testified that the Mexican Mafia collected this "el dime" from drug dealers.

Fourth, appellant contends that he offered a credible alibi. His alibi witness was a former lover who visited appellant in jail twice after he was charged. The jury could have disbelieved her testimony, believing her to be biased. But even if the jury believed her testimony, that testimony does not preclude appellant's commission of the crime. Even if the robbery began during the 5:30 to 6:30 time frame cited by Cruz (instead of at 3:00, testified to by Bazan), there would have been sufficient time for appellant to change clothes and walk to the Easy Shop, only a half-block away - although this testimony does conflict with Cruz's testimony about the events taking place after the crime.

Fifth, appellant contends that both a State's witness and the alibi witness described appellant wearing the same clothing. This claim is apparently a reference to Rodriguez's testimony that appellant wore blue jeans and a T-shirt and Mercedes's testimony that appellant wore jeans, a T-shirt, tennis shoes, and a cap. Although the rather generic "jeans and a T-shirt" testimony of each witness shows appellant wearing similar clothing, it does not establish that he wore the same clothing. Moreover, Rodriguez described appellant's clothing at the time he asked her for the keys to her car. Appellant could have put on the blue warmups described by Cruz after asking for the keys and then taken them off later. Or the jury could simply have disbelieved Mercedes' testimony.

Sixth, appellant contends that Cruz's testimony conflicts with that of other witnesses: the motel manager's testimony that the guests in room 16 did not check out until 7:45; Bazan's testimony that Lujan, not appellant, hit Bazan in the head with a weapon; and Bazan's testimony that Cruz, not appellant, stabbed Bazan in the head. Even if these statements did conflict, such conflicting testimony is of the type normally resolved by a factfinder.

Finally, appellant contends that Cruz was the only person not excluded as a donor of the DNA under the victim's fingernails. The expert testified, however, that the test of Cruz's DNA was inconclusive - Cruz was neither excluded nor included.

What we have in the present case is the testimony of two eyewitnesses who placed appellant at the scene of the crime, as a participant in the robbery, and as Ybarra's killer. A different witness testified to overhearing a conversation between appellant and his cohorts that was consistent with a planned murder. Several witnesses testified that appellant was a member of the Mexican Mafia, and there was testimony that the Mexican Mafia collected money from drug dealers, that Ybarra was a drug dealer, and that she was especially nervous or frightened the week before her murder. In the trunk of a car appellant borrowed shortly before the crime, authorities found clothing that contained appellant's blood and other clothing that contained Bazan's blood.

Having examined all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that a rational jury could have found appellant guilty of the crime. Moreover, after examining the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the supporting evidence is not so weak - nor is the contrary evidence so overwhelmingly strong - as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction. Point of error two is overruled.

2. Article 37.071, §2(g). Unless otherwise indicated all future references to Articles refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3. Article 37.071 §2(h).

4. The prosecutor stated:

Now, if according to the Defendant's theory the State spoon-fed Johnny Joe this story, well, we could have done a better job, couldn't we? There are some inconsistencies. There is the screw-up about the date of the arrest. Okay? When we talk to witnesses, we take what they tell us and we work with it. Okay? Yeah, there was a screw-up. There's a day lost. But what you've got [sic] remember is that these guys, Lujan, Johnny Joe and "Meme" were all junkies. They were shooting heroin, they were shooting cocaine. And yeah, Johnny Joe may not have his time sequence down right, and I will concede that.

5. In cross-examination, Bazan indicated that Lujan and Cruz were not wearing masks when Bazan looked out the window before opening the door.

6. In earlier direct testimony, Bazan seemed to indicate that Cruz was helping appellant when Ybarra uttered her final cry, but on cross-examination, Bazan maintained that Cruz was trying to strangle him at that particular time.

7. Abbreviation for Texas Department of Corrections, now known as the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division.

8. Texas Penal Code §7.02(a)(2): "A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if...acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense."

9. Cathey v. State, 992 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 (2000). Article 38.14 provides: "A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense."

10. Id. at 462-463.

11. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).

12. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

13. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1407 (2001).

14. Id.

15. See Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

16. Id. at 408-409.

17. We note that, although appellant does not refer to it in his brief, he also introduced the testimony of Galvan who stated that Cruz claimed responsibility for the murder and exonerated appellant. The jury was free to believe that Galvan was a member of the Mexican Mafia and was covering for a fellow member. Considering Galvan's testimony that he never signed a form acknowledging his membership along with Chavarria's testimony that Galvan did sign such a form, the jury could believe that Galvan was a perjurer, and consequently, that his testimony could not be trusted.

18. See United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, §1, Cl. 3: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

19. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-679 (1985). A due process violation is established if the prosecutor knowingly uses perjured testimony and the reviewing court cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony was harmless. Id. at 679 n. 9.

20. Id. at 678; Ex Parte Castellano, 863 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

21. See fn. 4, ante.

22. See Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

23. All references to rules are to the Texas Rules of Evidence unless otherwise indicated.

24. Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1102 (2000). Although we declined to address the Rule 404(b) issue in Medina because it was unpreserved, the discussion of relevance to appellant's motive applies equally in the Rule 404(b) context. See Rule 404(b)("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive....").

25. Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

26. Id. (quoting Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)(citing 1 Steven Goode et al, Texas Practice: Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 403.2, at 93 (2d ed.1993))).

27. Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).