Robbie James Lyons | Murderpedia, the encyclopedia of murderers

Robbie James Lyons (10 July 1972 – 5 December 2003) was convicted of the 1993 murder of Stephen Wilson Stafford and in 2003 was executed at Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina.

Prior arrests

A series of arrests and releases in 1993 preceded the murder for which Lyons was later executed. Convicted on 16 April 1993 on multiple charges of larceny and forgery, Lyons was sentenced to 17 months in prison; however, he served only a month of this sentence and was released on 17 May 1993. He was arrested again a month later on charges of armed robbery, for which he received three years probation on a plea bargain; he used an alias, and even though his real name was known, his prior arrest and improper release were overlooked. Finally, four days before the murder of Stephen Stafford, Lyons was arrested a third time for failure to appear in court, for which he was released on a $50 bond.

Crime

The murder of Stephen Wilson Stafford occurred on 25 September 1993, apparently as part of an attempted robbery. Stafford was the owner of a small store in Forsyth County, North Carolina. According to the testimony of Derick Hall, an alleged accomplice who was in the store with Lyons at the time of the murder, Lyons chose to rob the store on the spur of the moment because he was out of money. Hall claimed not to have participated directly in the robbery, but that he heard Lyons fire five shots at Stafford and disappear; Hall turned himself into police custody on the following day. Victoria Lytle, a witness who had just left Stafford's store, also claimed that she heard gunshots and saw Lyons leave the store with a gun in hand shortly afterwards.

Trial

Following Lyons' conviction on 6 May 1994, allegations arose of poor legal representation; Lyons' trial attornies put forward no evidence during the trial. Additionally, Lyons' primary attorney was primarily a real estate lawyer and had only met Lyons once before the trial. A psychologist testified during deliberations on Lyons' sentencing that he suffered from bipolar disorder, antisocial personality disorder and had a history of substance abuse from a very early age. Lyon's mother provided an affidavit, which was not presented at trial, testifying that Lyons was the result of an unexpected teenage pregnancy and grew up in a household where he was regularly abused and beaten by his grandmother.

Lyons' extensive and violent criminal history was also a factor brought forward by those arguing against clemency. A month prior to his execution, Lyons assaulted a prison guard and prison authorities placed him in solitary confinement for the final days of his incarceration.

After the U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in Lyons' case on 6 October 2003, the state of North Carolina set an execution date of 5 December 2003. Lyons was set to be the seventh convicted murderer executed by North Carolina that year, making 2003 a peak for executions in the state (exceeded only in recent history by 1949, which saw 10 executions).

Execution

As was customary, North Carolina governor Mike Easley reviewed pleas for clemency; prior to the execution he met both with Lyon's defense attorneys and members of Stafford's family. Reverend Jesse Jackson also wrote to Mike Easley just prior to Lyon's execution, also pleading for a commutation of the death sentence. Easley declined to commute Lyons' death sentence.

Lyons' final meal prior to his execution was pizza and lasagna, both prepared in accordance with Islamic dietary law, and a Pepsi. His final words were: "It is from Allah that I come and it is to Allah that I return. If my death brings another person happiness, then I'm happy for them." Lyons was pronounced dead at North Carolina's Central Prison in Raleigh at 2:17 a.m. in the early morning of 5 December 2003. His execution was the 885th carried out in the United States, and the 30th in North Carolina, since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976.

Wikipedia.org

Notes:

The trial court arrested judgment on the conviction of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon

These facts are derived from the statement of facts in the Supreme Court of North Carolina's published opinion affirming Lyons's conviction and sentence for first-degree felony murder on direct appealSee State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 468 S.E.2d 204 (1996).

Lyons does not challenge the armed robbery conviction

The common law robbery conviction stemmed from a crime that took place on Stratford Road in Winston-Salem. Lyons was originally charged with robbery with a deadly weapon (armed robbery). On August 10, 1993, Lyons entered a negotiated guilty plea to common law robbery pursuant toNorth Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Lyons was sentenced to probation and released. His probation was terminated in October 1993.

Because Lyons entered an Alford plea, to show "actual innocence," he must show that he was factually innocent of both the common law robbery charge to which he pleaded and the original charge of armed robberySee Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) ("In cases where the Government has forgone more serious charges in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner's showing of actual innocence must also extend to those charges.").

Lyons claims that he is innocent of the original charge of armed robbery because the pellet pistol was not functional. According to Lyons, "Tracee Smith [the driver of the car] knew that the gun used by [Lyons's co-defendant] to threaten the alleged victim was a non-functional pellet gun belonging to her nephew." (Appellant's Br. at 12-13.) There is no indication that such testimony could not have been presented in 1993 through the exercise of due diligence.

Moreover, Lyons does not rebut the finding of the state habeas court that denied his Motion for Appropriate Relief (the state MAR court) that "the State had strong evidence of [Lyons's] guilt of armed robbery pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-87." (J.A. at 455.)

The Supreme Court held inMcKoy that the North Carolina jury instruction requiring a jury unanimously to find the existence of mitigating circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment. McKoy, 494 U.S. at 439, 110 S.Ct. 1227. In this case, the trial court did not instruct the jury that it unanimously must find the existence of mitigating circumstances. The jury was instructed to resolve four issues in reaching its decision at the sentencing phase of the trial: (1) whether the jury unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the aggravating circumstance; (2) whether one or more members of the jury found one or more mitigating circumstances; (3) whether the jury unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the mitigating circumstances found by one or more jurors are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance found unanimously by the jury; and (4) whether the jury unanimously found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstance, if found, is sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death sentence when considered with the mitigating circumstances found by one or more jurors. We have upheld this portion of the instructions delivered by North Carolina courts as not violative of McKoy on several occasions. See Williams v. French, 146 F.3d 203, 215-16 (4th Cir.1998); Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 213-14 (4th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 981 n. 15 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc); Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743, 754 (4th Cir.1993); Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 418-20 (4th Cir.1991).

After three hours of deliberation, the jury asked "whether or not [its] decision [had] to be unanimous on issue number four." (J.A. at 129.) The court responded "your decision on issue number four does have to be unanimous. If you're unanimous — if all twelve of you find yes, then you would answer it yes. If all twelve of you find no, then you would answer it no." (J.A. at 129.)

Issue Four on the verdict sheet asked, "Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance found unanimously by you in Issue One is sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found by one or more of you?" (J.A. at 139.)

The response given by the judge was consistent with the earlier instructions, which we have found did not violateMcKoy. See also Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 889 (4th Cir. 1998) (rejecting similar claim that requiring unanimity as to the sentence recommendation violated McKoy), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

Moreover, the lack of an instruction regarding the consequences of a deadlock was not unconstitutionally coercive. The United States Supreme Court recently held that a trial court need not instruct the jury as to the consequences should it fail to reach a unanimous decision. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381-82, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999).

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