The Davidian Massacre by Carol Moore
BATF AND TREASURY DEPARTMENT COVERUPS
I didn't even know there was such a thing as the ATF.
I had heard of Eliot Ness and the Untouchables. . .I didn't know they
still existed. . .I don't have any animosity toward them, then or now,
especially the line agents, the street guys. I figure they were just
doing what they were told.
agents and officials have a strong motivation for covering up BATF agent
crimes: the fear of disciplinary actions, firing, law suits and even
prosecution for negligent or even intentional homicide in the deaths of
Branch Davidians. Treasury Department officials' motivation is more
bureaucratic: preventing dissolution of BATF and transfer of its
functions and personnel to the FBI. While the Treasury Department did
find fault with actions of raid commanders and high BATF officials, it
staunchly denies that any crimes were committed against the Davidians.
Throughout the preceding chapters indications of BATF and
Treasury Department coverups have been noted. Additional evidence
Treasury Department report admits only that BATF commanders tried to
cover up their decision to go ahead with the raid despite the loss of
surprise, and that several officials disregarded evidence of this
coverup. Some believe that the "loss of surprise" accusation is just a
smoke screen for BATF's real crime: using illegal military tactics on
civilians, leading to ten deaths.
Intimidated the Press
In the hours before the raid, law enforcement made no attempt
to stop reporters from approaching Mount Carmel, including the
television camera crew that drove up Mount Carmel's driveway right
behind BATF cattle trucks. However, once the raid became a debacle,
captured on film, BATF turned against the press.
On February 28th BATF agents verbally and physically
assaulted KWTX-TV cameraman Dan Mulloney as he filmed dead BATF agents.
Mulloney captured the assault on video tape. In trial testimony
Mulloney denied he had impeded BATF in any way.2/
BATF planners and agents blamed the Waco Tribune-Herald for
not delaying publication of "The Sinful Messiah" series until after the
BATF raid. BATF later accused KWTX-TV's Dan Mulloney and John McLemore
of making a deal with Davidians that they would warn them of the
impending raid if they were allowed to hide in a tree and tape the
Some BATF agents and families accused the publisher of the
Waco Tribune-Herald of being a "murderer" for running his series on the
Branch Davidians before the raid. In March, 1993 wounded BATF agent
John T. Risenhoover filed a lawsuit claiming that an unnamed Waco
Tribune-Herald employee warned David Koresh about the impending raid.
Risenhoover's lawsuit claimed the newspaper reneged on an agreement to
withhold its series on David Koresh and the Branch Davidians until BATF
completed its investigation. Assumedly, Risenhoover could have found
out about this alleged agreement only from higher-up agents and
officials who mistakenly thought they had such an agreement with the
newspaper.4/ In early 1994 the families of deceased agents sued the
Waco Tribune-Herald and KWTX-TV for tipping off the Davidians about the
BATF immediately distanced itself from Risenhoover's lawsuit.
"This is strictly between the agent and the newspaper," said BATF
spokeswoman Sharon Wheeler.6/ However, many suspect that this was just
part of a broader government effort to intimidate the media.
In March, 1993 BATF and FBI "gagged" their agents, forbidding
them to speak to the press, a policy which continues to this day. Both
agencies warned that "loose and often uninformed comments to the press"
might jeopardize the investigation and undermine public confidence in
the agencies.7/ Such warnings, of course, are backed by the threat of
disciplinary action and even firing.
Examples of disinformation have been mentioned in previous
chapters--especially the dubious allegation the Davidians "ambushed"
BATF agents and used grenades and machineguns. The press widely quoted
BATF spokesperson Sharon Wheeler's statement the day after the raid,
"Everything would have been fine, except their guns were bigger than
ours." Other examples are BATF officials harping on the most lurid
accusations of child abuse, religious fanaticism and arms buildups.
BATF spokesman Jack Killorin claimed, "The warrant is for an
imminent threat to the life and safety of everybody in that compound.
The warrant is for the illicit manufacture of explosives and explosive
devices which right away is an immediate threat to the life and safety
of every person in there."8/ However, the Treasury report never
mentions this "for-their-own-good" rationale.
The greatest disinformation related to coverups of BATF
agent errors and crimes--the shooting from helicopters that killed four
Davidians, the shooting of Perry Jones, friendly fire, and the death of
Michael Schroeder. Other BATF disinformation was disseminated as part
of additional coverups described in the following sections.
Commanders Covered Up Loss of Surprise
When BATF finally informed the Treasury's Office of Law
Enforcement of the planned raid on Friday, February 26, 1993, Acting
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John P. Simpson decided the action
was too dangerous and "directed that the operation not go forward."
Also expressing reservations was Ronald K. Noble, the designated, but
unconfirmed, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement,
who was acting as a consultant.
In a Friday night conference call, BATF Director Stephen
Higgins told Simpson and Noble that he had obtained reassurance from
raid co-commander Phillip Chojnacki that the "raid could be executed
safely" and that "the raid would be aborted. . .if things did not look
right," i.e., if there was any evidence of a "change in routine." Noble
told a House Appropriations subcommittee that Higgins had told him, "if
for any reason they lose the element of surprise. . .express orders or
directives to call off the operation."9/
Simpson allowed the raid to go forward, "after these
assurances were given." Deputy Treasury Secretary Roger Altman was
informed of the upcoming raid, but Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen, who
was in Europe, was not.10/
However, even after Chojnacki learned from his co-commander
Chuck Sarabyn that the Davidians knew BATF was coming, and after
consulting briefly with SAC Ted Royster, he allowed the raid to go
forward. (Royster did not have a "raid-specific" title, but he had the
power to abort the raid because of his position as Special
Agent-in-Charge of Dallas BATF.) Chojnacki even called the National
Command Center in Washington and reported that the raid was commencing.
He did not report that the Davidians knew about the raid. When
undercover agent Rodriguez learned that the raid was underway he was
It would be more than two months before this account of what
really happened that morning would be related to the press and the
public. From the start, BATF officials denied reports like one in the
Los Angeles Times that stated an agent was heard shouting, "We've gotta
move. He's been tipped off."12/ Undercover agent Robert Rodriguez and
three other agents who overheard the conversation told BATF
investigators that Rodriguez had told Sarabyn that Koresh knew a raid
However, commander Chuck Sarabyn claimed that Rodriguez "was
not real descriptive as to the ATF-National Guard statement" and
commander Phillip Chojnacki claimed that Sarabyn had not told him
anything about Koresh's prior knowledge. Chojnacki and Sarabyn also
tried to cover up their lack of professionalism and errors by altering
the written plan of the raid, which they had not issued before it took
place. They did not tell the Texas Rangers or the Treasury review team
that it had been altered. They then tried to blame the alterations on a
lower ranking agent who had assisted them. Finally, they confessed the
truth to the Treasury review team.13/
Officials Covered Up Loss of Surprise
Associate Director Daniel Hartnett and Intelligence Division
Chief David Troy gave less credence to Rodriguez and other low ranking
agents' accounts than to those of their superiors Sarabyn and Chojnacki.
So Troy continued to deny to the press that the commanders knew that
Koresh had been alerted.14/ Rodriguez testified during the trial that
he wondered if there was some strategy behind this continued
disinformation; however, just in case, he hired himself an attorney.
(In February, 1995 Rodriquez filed suit against BATF, raid commanders
and officials, alleging they had violated his privacy and civil rights,
defamed him and conspired to make him a scapegoat.)15/
During March, 1993 the Texas Rangers were gathering even more
evidence, including from 60 BATF agents, that raid commanders Sarabyn
and Chojnacki knew that they had lost the element of surprise. They
passed this along to Hartnett and Conroy. However, "Hartnett and Conroy
failed to keep [BATF Director] Higgins informed about the mounting
weight of evidence that Sarabyn and Chojnacki's account was false," so
Higgins continued to mislead the press and the public. In late March
Director Higgins wrote a memo to BATF agents denying there was a coverup
of "mistakes in planning, leadership or both" after he discovered some
agents were planning to make coverup allegations to the media.16/
Finally, in early April, after a number of agents contacted
Higgins directly to complain about these misstatements, Higgins asked
for a copy of Rodriguez' statement. Yet for another month Higgins
allowed Hartnett and Conroy to instruct Troy to keep denying that raid
commanders had definitive knowledge about the loss of surprise. And
only under pressure from the Treasury review team did Sarabyn,
Chojnacki, Hartnett and Conroy finally admit to their roles in the
coverup.17/ Ted Royster also participated in the coverup, claiming he
did not know that surprise had been lost. When Noble threatened him
with disciplinary action, "Royster then sent agents a three-page letter
outlining personal pressures and career problems that caused his memory
with Texas Rangers' Investigation
As we have seen, the U.S. Attorney's office in Waco deputized
the Texas Rangers as U.S. Marshals for the criminal investigation.
Nevertheless, BATF continued to interfere with the investigations,
including after the fire. The Justice report reveals, "a memorandum of
understanding between the FBI and ATF gave the ATF jurisdiction in cases
involving the injury or death of their own agents."19/ It was BATF
agents Aguilera and Dunagan who continued to issue search and arrest
warrants during the siege.
Texas Ranger David Byrnes testified that on April 19, 1993
Texas Rangers did not start taking over the scene until 3:00 p.m., two
hours after the fire had burned the building to the ground. Thirty-two
Texas Rangers supervised 60 or more federal agents.20/
News footage clearly shows, dozens of agents walking through
the smoldering ruins in the hours immediately following the fire.
Clearly, they considered themselves to be in complete control of the
crime scene--local news video tape taken a few hours after the fire
shows a federal agent urinating against the side of a tank sitting
amidst the ruins!21/
Byrnes revealed that one or more BATF explosives experts did
the "initial explosive sweep." He claimed that BATF agents were
excluded from within the police tape so that no one could claim BATF had
"salted" the scene. Ranger Fred Cummings revealed the BATF bomb squad
was there was there on April 20th as well as on the 19th.22/
Byrnes also disclosed that Texas Rangers had run the BATF
flag up Mount Carmel's flag post on request of BATF agents. During
closing arguments defense attorney Dan Cogdell said angrily, "What kind
of people stuck a flag like they've won a war, like some overgrown G.I.
Joes?"23/ Again, many believe that deputizing Texas state
investigators as U.S. Marshals prevented them from fully investigating
BATF and FBI crimes.
Koresh's Gun Dealer Into "Protective Custody"
March 1, 1993, the day after the failed raid, BATF agents
took custody of gun dealer Henry McMahon and his woman friend Karen
Kilpatrick. In September, 1993 Dick DeGuerin revealed: "They told these
two people they were in danger from Branch Davidians who were not inside
Mount Carmel who might try to kill them and convinced them to ask for
BATF obviously was afraid the public and politicians would be
sympathetic with the Davidians if it learned David Koresh had cooperated
fully with BATF agents. For four weeks BATF agents also tried to keep
them McMahon and Kilpatrick away from the press and the FBI.
When the couple finally rebelled against BATF's confinement,
BATF flew them to Waco. BATF agents Davy Aguilera and Dale Littleton
grilled them for hours seeking evidence of criminal conduct by the
Davidians. Aguilera threatened to arrest them for conspiracy to commit
murder of federal agents. In a lawsuit, Kilpatrick accuses Littleton of
physically assaulting her by knocking her against a wall when she would
not answer his questions. They later were interviewed by a U.S. staff
attorney but the government never charged either with a crime. BATF
agents made it clear they would never allow McMahon to work as a gun
dealer again and he let his license lapse, due to fears of
Given the damaging testimony that McMahon could have provided
against agent Aguilera and the BATF agents who took him into custody, it
is not surprising that prosecutors claimed that McMahon told "Elvis"
stories about BATF's mistreatment of him after the raid. Smith agreed
to the prosecution's demand that McMahon not be allowed to testify in
person during the trial and that his written testimony be restricted.26/
Fatta Charged After Press Interviews
Another individual who could attest to David Koresh's legal
gun business was Paul Fatta, who ran the business. He was in Austin
with his son selling weapons and equipment at a gun show on the morning
of February 28th. Fatta offered his assistance to the FBI to bring
about a peaceful end to the standoff. However, they refused his help
and were abusive towards him. Fatta began give interviews to reporters,
asserting that the Davidians were not violent or paramilitary and that
Davidians had a gun business. His commentn received national
The fact that Fatta was drumming up sympathy for the
Davidians in the press doubtless motivated BATF to bring charges against
Fatta, something his attorney brought up at trial. When Fatta heard
these charges had been brought, he contacted an attorney--but BATF would
not tell him what the charges against Fatta were. Fearful for his life,
and wanting to get his son to safety, Fatta left Texas for Oregon.28/
BATF issued a warrant for Fatta's arrest and declared that he
was "armed and dangerous." This action further frightened Fatta into
believing BATF would murder him if he surrendered to them. Fatta
finally surrendered to Texas Rangers in Houston on April 26. Fatta's
attorney Mike DeGeurin told reporters Fatta did not surrender earlier
because of his "mistrust of federal agents."29/
Kept Warrants Sealed After Koresh Saw Them
Immediately after the failed February 28th raid, BATF had the
magistrate seal the contents of the affidavit and search and arrest
warrants supposedly "to ensure the integrity of an ongoing criminal
investigation." The Associated Press noted, "One problem with either
criticism or support for the government is that the reasons for the raid
remain largely secret. The original search and arrest warrants remain
sealed, and the ATF won't say exactly what it was looking for, or what
information it has."30/
On March 19th the FBI delivered to David Koresh "copies of
legal documents concerning the ATF warrants."31/ Despite the fact that
Koresh now knew the contents of the February and later March affidavits
and warrants, the government refused to release these to the press and
public until April 20, 1993, the day after Koresh's death.32/
Treasury Department's official report on BATF actions does expose inept
planning and execution of the BATF raid. However, it defends the
probable cause basis for the search and arrest warrants, excuses the
decision to go forward with a paramilitary raid and ignores evidence
that agents committed crimes like firing from helicopters and killing
Michael Schroeder. Throughout these chapters documentation shows where
the Treasury report has failed to provide information or has provided
About Oversight of the Review
In late April, 1993 Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen selected
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Law Enforcement Ronald K. Noble
to head the investigation. As we know, Noble approved the decision to
go ahead with the raid. Since he had not been confirmed at that point,
Noble had no formal authority. However, he still retains moral
responsibility. Therefore, Noble would have little interest in issuing
a report that either would challenge significantly BATF's investigation
or operations modus operandi or would admit these led to crimes against
The Treasury Department named three individuals to be
"independent reviewers" of BATF's actions in Waco. There have been
questions about two of them. Henry S. Ruth, Jr., a former Watergate
prosecutor, served on the Special Investigative Commission that examined
law enforcement actions in connection with the police assault on the
MOVE group which resulted in a devastating fire that destroyed two city
blocks and killed 11 MOVE members. Another reviewer, Willie L.
Williams, had been a high-ranking Philadelphia police official during
the MOVE incident and became police commissioner in 1988.33/ Because
Ruth's investigation never recommended any prosecutions, despite the
Philadelphia police's dropping a fire bomb on a building that killed
eleven MOVE members, many doubt either man was likely to criticize
Taken Under Oath
There is no indication that any individuals gave testimony
under oath to those who conducted the review. In fact, the Treasury's
review team seems to have been hampered in getting at the whole truth by
"employment contracts," the "Privacy Act" and the "Federal Advisory
Committee Act."34/ Also, some of the BATF officials who testified
before congressional committees were not sworn in and they still could
be prosecuted were it proved they had lied to a congressional
committee--as some of those who eventually were dismissed may have done.
It is likely that some BATF agents who met with the Treasury
Department's review teams later changed their stories at trial to
conform to the "official line" that agents had been ambushed and that
Davidians shot first. So not only did review teams not take testimony
under oath, they may have encouraged those interviewed to lie under
Department Attempted to Seal Investigation Records
In mid-August 1993 the Treasury Department proposed exempting
the Treasury Department's report from public scrutiny. The Treasury
Department gave the public a month to comment. Because radio talk show
hosts encouraged protest, the Treasury received 5,150 telegrams and
letters, an unusually large number. David Kopel, director of the
Firearms Research Project in Denver said, "I think it is a scandalous
attempt to cover up the facts surrounding one of the greatest
governmental disasters in the 20th century."35/
Department Report Demonizes Davidians
The Treasury report demonizes David Koresh and the Branch
Davidians in an obvious attempt to excuse BATF's shoddy investigation
and aggressive raid. The Treasury report makes allegations against
Koresh which were not made either in Davy Aguilera's original affidavit
or during the trial, including the Bunds' family accusations about
Koresh's preparing a "hit list" of former members, the finding of an
alleged machinegun conversion kit, and Donald Bunds' alleged comments
that he himself would resist authorities if they tried to arrest him.36/
The report claims Mount Carmel Center had been renamed "Ranch
Apocalypse." The only evidence I found of this is Clifford L.
Linedecker and a Washington Post reporter's repeating two different
stories that Perry Jones had made this claim when paying bills in late
1992. Judge Smith would not allow mention of such a name change during
the trial because of the lack of evidence.37/
The Treasury report also refers to Kathryn Schroeder's
allegation--which they discovered well after the raid--that Koresh "told
his followers that soon they would go out into the world, turn their
weapons on individual members of the public, and kill those who did not
say they were believers. As he explained to his followers, `you can't
die for God if you can't kill for God.' Koresh later canceled the
planned action, telling his followers that it had been a test of their
loyalty to him." However, even prosecutors admitted this description of
a conversation Koresh had with a few Davidians after the 1991 massacre
at Luby's restaurant in Killeen, Texas, was a prejudicial accusation of
questionable value and did not ask Schroeder to repeat it during the
trial. And Schroeder at trial did not link the statement about "killing
for God" to any specific event.38/
The Treasury report also made much of social worker Joyce
Sparks' allegation that during one of her conversations with him he
said: "My time is coming. When I reveal myself as the messenger and my
time comes, what happens will make the riots in L.A. pale in
comparison."39/ However, even the anti-Davidian trial judge would not
allow this obvious reference to biblical prophecy to be mentioned in
court, because, even if Koresh said it, he did not do so in furtherance
of any conspiracy.40/ American political activists of both the right
and left often use aggressive rhetoric and joke about violence. If
these are the only examples of aggressive rhetoric that Koresh's critics
could find, Koresh appears to have been a relatively non-aggressive
Prosecutions of Agents or Officials
Immediately after the September, 1993 release of the Treasury
report, Treasury Secretary Bentsen put Hartnett, Conroy, Troy, Chojnacki
and Sarabyn on administrative leave. Hartnett and Conroy immediately
resigned. Bentsen also removed BATF Director Higgins, who had another
month to go before retirement.
In February, 1994 BATF recommended that Phil Chojnacki and
Chuck Sarabyn be fired for improperly supervising the 1993 raid on the
Davidians. They challenged the recommendation.41/ It was not until
late October, 1994 that BATF finally fired Sarabyn and Chojnacki, and
even then they were asserting they had been wronged. They asserted they
ignored Koresh's statement about "ATF coming" because he "often said
such things." They did not explain why they alerted most BATF agents to
the fact Koresh had said this.42/
After their case went before the Federal Merit Systems
Protections Board, Chojnacki and Sarabyn were rehired by BATF in
December, 1994. Sarabyn was moved to Washington, D.C., and named chief
of the BATF's Visual Information Branch which aids in criminal trial
preparation. Chojnacki remained in Houston and was named liaison
between BATF and the U.S. Customs Service. Sarabyn's attorney Steve
Gardner told reporters, "Our position all along was that the Treasury
review had been a jerry-rigged, cooked-up piece of work that had been
cooked up at the getgo so they could blame Chuck and Phil. When (the
raid) backfired and didn't go the way they thought it should go,
Treasury started looking for scapegoats."43/ Many believe Chojnacki and
Sarabyn threatened to reveal BATF crimes if they were not rehired.
National Association of Treasury Agents deputy director Jim
Jorgensen denounced the Treasury Department for reinstating Chojnacki
and Sarabyn. "It defiles the memory of the brave ATF agents who gave
their lives doing their duty. . .It sends a message to these living
agents that their lives aren't worth a plugged nickel."44/
Dallas BATF chief Ted Royster was not disciplined, but
instead was made director of Project Alliance, a multi-agency drug task
force on the Mexican border. "I was cleared of any wrongdoing. If I
had done anything wrong, it would have come out in the report," Royster
told a reporter.45/
U.S. government has conspired successfully to hide from the public that
BATF actually drove the Branch Davidians to self-defense. The Justice
Department and FBI instead of taking pity on the persecuted Davidians,
merely continued the persecution, ultimately killing most members of the
1. James L. Pate, July, 1994, p. 47.
2. Trial transcript, p. 3325.
3. From audio tape of John O. Lumpkin, Texas Bureau Chief of
the Associated Press, speaking at September 10, 1993 Freedom of
Information Foundation panel on "Mt. Carmel: What Should the Public
Know"; John McLemore and Dan Mulloney statement on "The Maury Show,"
November 9, 1993.
4. John Lumpkin comments; Treasury Department report, p. 59,
5. Tommy Witherspoon, "Wife of slain ATF agent sues Trib, KWTX,"
Waco Tribune-Herald, March 23, 1994; Tommy Witherspoon, "ATF agent's
family sues media, ambulance service," Waco Tribune-Herald, March 31,
6. Associated Press wire story, March 13, 1993, 02:57 EST.
7. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press report, "The
Clinton Administration and the News Media," 1994; Jacque Crouse, "ATF
agents fume beneath Waco gag order," Washington Times, April 5, 1994.
8. Daniel Wattenberg, p. 38.
9. June 9, 1993, House Appropriations subcommittee hearing, p.
10. Treasury Department report, pgs. 75-76, 178.
11. Ibid. pgs. 89-91, 165.
12. Newsweek, March 15, 1993, p. 55.
13. Treasury Department report, pgs. 196-199, 208-10.
14. Ibid. pgs. 196-99.
15. Associated Press, "ATF brass lied, agent testifies in Waco
trial," Washington Times, January 29, 1994; Lee Hancock, "Agent sues ATF
officials, Bureau in Koresh cult raid, He says agency made him scapegoat
to hide its errors," The Dallas Morning News, Saturday, February 25,
16. Jerry Seper, "ATF chief denies Waco cover-up,' Washington
Times, April 19, 1993, A3.
17. Treasury Department report, p. 199-206.
18. Kathy Fair, "Report on Waco cult raid likely to be
scathing," Houston Chronicle, September 26, 1993, 9A.
19. Justice Department report, p. 23.
20. Trial transcript, pgs. 603, 1162.
21. Video footage included in "Waco, the Big Lie Continues."
22. Trial transcript, pgs. 614, 1087-88.
23. Ibid. pgs. 643, 7256.
24. From audiotape of September 10, 1993 Freedom of
Information Foundation media panel on "Mount Carmel: What Should the
Public Know?" in Austin, Texas.
25. "Gun Couple Sues Feds," The Balance, newsletter of the
Cause Foundation, March-April, 1995, pgs. 6, 8.
26. Trial transcript, pgs. 6841-43.
27. Michael deCourcy Hinds, March 6, 1993, A1.
28. Trial transcript, pgs. 527, 4375-76.
29. Ron Engelman, "Ron's Waco Update," The Freedom Report,
September, 1993; Ron Cole, p. 53; Hugh Aynesworth, "Koresh followers set
fires," Washington Times, April 27, 1993.
30. Associated Press wire story, March 11, 1993, 16:23 EST.
31. Justice Department report, p. 74.
32. Sam Howe Verhovek, "FBI Cites Fresh Evidence That Cult Set
Fatal Fire," New York Times, April 21, 1994, A20.
33. Treasury Department report, p. 3.
34. Ibid. p. 6.
35. Lee Hancock, "Thousands protest proposal to limit access
to cult data," Dallas Morning News, September 23, 1993; Jerry Seper,
"Treasury wants to hide reports on Waco raid," Washington Times,
September 2, 1993.
36. Treasury Department report, p. 28.
37. Ibid. p. 127; Clifford L. Lindecker, pgs. 17-18; Mary
Jordan and Sue Anne Pressley, "Freed Cult Members Depict Horror Scene,"
Washington Post, March 4, 1993, A11; trial transcript, pgs. 446-47.
38. Treasury Department report, p. 127; Clare Tuma report,
"Court TV," February 3, 1994; trial transcript, p. 4415-18.
39. Treasury Department report, p. 30.
40. Trial transcript, p. 456.
41. Pierre Thomas, "ATF Officials Ousted Over Raid,"
Washington Post, October 1, 1993; "ATF recommends firing Davidian raid
leaders," Washington Times, February 12, 1994.
42. "Agents Dismissed in Raid on Sect Say They Were Blamed
Unfairly," New York Times, November 13, 1994, A38.
43. Lee Hancock, "ATF re-hires two agents fired after raid on
cultists," Dallas Morning News, December 22, 1994, 26A.
44. Theresa Talerico, "A Time for Tears," Waco Tribune-Herald,
March 1, 1995.
45. Associated Press, "Top ATF official transferred," Waco
Tribune-Herald, October 27, 1993, 3C.