State v. Holton, 126 S.W.3d 845 (Tenn.
2004) (Direct Appeal).
Background: Defendant was convicted in the Circuit
Court, Bedford County, William Charles Lee, J., of four counts of first-degree
premeditated murder, and he was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed,
and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
Holdings: On direct appeal, the Supreme Court, Frank
F. Drowota, III, C.J., held that:
(1) evidence was sufficient to support convictions;
(2) insanity statute does not unconstitutionally shift burden of proof
to defendant to negate essential element of offense;
(3) alleged residual doubts as to defendant's mental state at time of
killings did not entitle him to relief from death sentences;
(4) certain elements of capital sentencing scheme were not
unconstitutional;
(5) evidence was sufficient to support jury's findings of aggravated
circumstances and that those circumstances outweighed mitigating
circumstances beyond reasonable doubt; and
(6) death sentences were not disproportionate to penalties imposed in
similar cases. Affirmed.
FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J.
The defendant, Daryl Keith Holton, was convicted of four counts of first
degree premeditated murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death on each
conviction, finding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances FN2 and
that the aggravating circumstances so proven outweighed any and all
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant
appealed, challenging both his convictions and sentences.
After fully considering the defendant's claims, the
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and the sentences.
The case was then docketed in this Court, briefs were filed, and after
considering the briefs and the record, this Court entered an Order
requesting that the parties address certain issues at oral argument,
including the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the
constitutionality of the statutory insanity defense, the
constitutionality of Tennessee's capital sentencing scheme in light of
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435
(2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d
556 (2002), and the propriety of the death sentences in light of the
mandatory review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-13-206(c)(A)-(D) (1997). After carefully and fully considering the
issues in light of the record and the relevant authority, we affirm the
defendant's convictions and sentences.
FN2. As to three of the convictions, the jury relied
upon both the age of the victim and the mass murder aggravating
circumstances in imposing the death penalty. See Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-13-204(i)(1) & (12) (1997). As to the fourth conviction, the jury
based imposition of the death penalty solely upon the mass murder
aggravating circumstance.
I. Background
A. Guilt Phase
On November 30, 1997, the defendant, thirty-six-year-old
Daryl Keith Holton, shot and killed his four children, four, six, ten,
and twelve years old. The State charged the defendant with four counts
of premeditated murder. The critical issue at trial was the defendant's
mental state at the time of the killings.
The State's proof showed that the defendant and
Crystal Holton, the mother of the victims, married in 1984 while the
defendant was serving in the United States Army and stationed at Fort
Jackson in South Carolina. Shortly after their marriage, the defendant
was reassigned to a post in Germany where he administered a dental
clinic.
While the defendant was stationed in Germany, the
couple had two sons: Stephen, born in 1985, and Brent, born in 1987. Mrs.
Holton testified that the defendant “loved” his military career, but she
characterized their marriage as “up and down.”
After his tour of duty in Germany, the defendant was
stationed at Fort Gordon in Georgia. While there, he volunteered for
service in Saudi Arabia at the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War. Mrs.
Holton remained in the United States with Stephen and Brent, and on
September 17, 1991, she gave birth to a third son, Eric, who was hearing-impaired.
Shortly after Eric's birth, the federal government incorrectly routed
the defendant's paychecks causing Mrs. Holton serious financial
difficulties.
Also during the fall of 1991 Mrs. Holton left her
children home alone overnight while she went to a country music bar and
dance hall. The police were called after one of the children arrived at
a neighbor's house looking for his mother. When Mrs. Holton returned
home the next morning, the police declined to bring criminal charges,
and representatives of the Georgia Department of Children's Services
allowed Mrs. Holton to retain custody of the children.
After learning of these events, the defendant secured
an emergency leave of absence and returned to the United States for
several days. During this time, the defendant moved his family from
Georgia to his father's home in Shelbyville, Tennessee. However, after
the defendant returned to Saudi Arabia, Mrs. Holton left Shelbyville to
visit a cousin in Indiana and thereafter moved to South Carolina,
leaving the children in the custody of the defendant's father. The
defendant obtained a hardship discharge and returned to Shelbyville so
that he could care for his children.
In June of 1992, he returned to Georgia and obtained
a divorce and custody of the three boys. He and the children returned to
Shelbyville; however, Mrs. Holton testified that the defendant brought
the children to visit her in South Carolina two or three times each
month.
After Mrs. Holton became pregnant in late 1992 as a
result of a “one night stand,” she and the defendant reconciled and
lived together in Shelbyville. On June 22, 1993, Mrs. Holton gave birth
to her daughter, Kayla Marie. According to Mrs. Holton, the defendant
accepted Kayla “rather well” and gave her his last name. Although the
couple did not remarry, they lived together with the four children for
approximately two years. During this time, Mrs. Holton drank heavily,
and the defendant struck her on several occasions, blaming his violence
on her drinking.
Eventually Mrs. Holton and the children left the
defendant and moved into public housing in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The
defendant visited the children on a daily basis while they lived in
Murfreesboro and was at some point awarded weekend visitation rights.
Mrs. Holton testified that the defendant would pick up the children on
Friday and return them on Sunday.
Mrs. Holton related that the defendant expressed
concern about the crime rate in the neighborhood where she and the
children lived and frequently complained about the condition of her
apartment. Mrs. Holton admitted that she was a mediocre housekeeper,
that she regularly accepted money from the defendant for the purchase of
alcohol, and that she purchased several pint-sized bottles of liquor
each week. However, Mrs. Holton said she had not demanded money or
liquor as a condition of the defendant's visitation with the children.
Mrs. Holton testified that the visitation happened
without incident until one Sunday night in 1995 when the defendant
refused to let the children get out of his car and ordered Mrs. Holton
to get into the car if she ever wanted to see the children again. When
Mrs. Holton refused, the defendant said, “Fine. You are going to regret
it,” and drove away. Mrs. Holton, who had the impression that the
defendant was armed,FN3 immediately called the police. Learning of his
former wife's call from a police “scanner” in his car, the defendant
surrendered the children to the police unharmed.
Mrs. Holton recalled that after this incident the
defendant continued to threaten that she would “regret it” if she ever
took his children away from him. Mrs. Holton acknowledged that, at some
point while she and the children were living in Murfreesboro, the
Tennessee Department of Children's Services briefly obtained legal
custody of the children, although Mrs. Holton retained physical custody.
Thereafter, on February 27, 1996, the defendant and
Mrs. Holton agreed to the entry of an order by the Bedford County
Juvenile Court granting Mrs. Holton custody of the children. The order
stated that the defendant agreed “it would be in the best interest of
the minor children that full custody be granted to the natural mother
with visitation to be at the discretion of the mother.” FN3. In his
confession to the homicides in this case, the defendant admitted that he
had been armed during the 1995 incident.
The defendant continued to visit the children until
the late summer or early fall of 1997, when Mrs. Holton obtained an
order of protection and moved with the children to a different residence.
In the fall of 1997, Mrs. Holton became romantically involved with
Morris Rhodes. In October 1997 she and the children moved to Rhodes'
home in Spring Hill, Tennessee.
Although he knew that Mrs. Holton and the children
had left their apartment in Murfreesboro, the defendant did not know
where they had gone until late November of 1997. On Thanksgiving Day of
that year, Mrs. Holton attempted to telephone the defendant at his
uncle's garage in Shelbyville, where the defendant lived and worked. No
one answered; however, the next day, the defendant returned Mrs.
Holton's call.
When Mrs. Holton told the defendant that the children
“missed him and ... wanted him to take them Christmas shopping,” the
defendant responded that “he didn't think anybody remembered he was
still their dad,” expressed concern that the children might be calling
Mr. Rhodes “Dad,” and said that he never wanted them to think that
anyone else was their father. After reassuring the defendant about his
relationship with the children, Mrs. Holton made arrangements for him to
visit with the children on Sunday, November 30.
The defendant telephoned Mrs. Holton again on
Saturday, November 29, to inquire whether he should purchase the
children clothing during the Sunday visit. He also asked permission to
take the children to a movie in Shelbyville and remarked that he wanted
to take the children by the garage where he lived and worked so they
could see a dog he kept there.
As agreed, the defendant picked up the four children
at a Murfreesboro Wal Mart around 3 p.m. on Sunday. The children were
excited about the visit. They ran to the defendant and hugged him. Two
of the children gave the defendant a drawing that said “From Brent and
Kayla. I love you Daddy.” Although the defendant returned their
embraces, Mrs. Holton said he appeared detached or “numb.”
The defendant agreed to return the children to Mrs.
Holton at 9:30 p.m. at the Rutherford County Sheriff's Department.FN4
FN4. As part of his own custody arrangements, Mr. Rhodes was scheduled
to pick up his daughter at the Rutherford County Sheriff's department
that same night.
The defendant did not arrive as planned, however.
Instead, he walked into the Shelbyville Police Department around 9:45
p.m. that night and told the dispatcher that he wanted to report a
“homicide times four.” The dispatcher described the defendant as calm
and said he displayed no emotion.
The dispatcher radioed for an officer and asked the
defendant to wait in the lobby. Soon thereafter, an officer arrived and
approached the defendant. After giving his name, address, and birth
date, the defendant again indicated that he wished to report four
homicides. When the officer asked how the defendant learned of the
homicides, the defendant responded that he had killed his four children
and then stood and placed his hands behind his back to allow the officer
to handcuff him.
The defendant confessed that, because his wife and
the Department of Human Services had kept his children from him for the
past few months, he had killed the four children with an SKS semi-automatic
rifle at his uncle's automobile repair garage, Holton's Wrecker Service
and Garage. The defendant indicated that the murder weapon and the
bodies were still located inside the garage.
The officers testified that the defendant appeared
normal and calm during this exchange, that he spoke in a matter-of-fact
tone, and that he never exhibited any bizarre behavior. One of the
officers had been acquainted with the defendant for several years, and
as the officers were leaving to investigate his claim, the defendant
warned this officer of the “bomb” in the garage.
At the garage, the officers discovered an SKS rifle
and homemade incendiary devices. The police also located the bodies of
the four children stacked underneath a plastic tarpaulin in the rear bay
of the garage, the area of the garage where the defendant lived.
The defendant gave two statements to the police
describing how he had killed his children. According to the defendant,
he had contemplated killing the children in 1995 when he was driving
them home to their mother following a weekend visit. On that occasion,
he had been armed with a “Derringer,” but he was unable to harm the
children and instead surrendered the children to the police.
He explained how, after his former wife obtained an
order of protection against him, he had driven by her apartment in
Murfreesboro “wanting something to happen,” then “they were gone.” When
Mrs. Holton finally called him to arrange visitation Thanksgiving
weekend, he decided to murder the children because they “had been taken
away from me and given back to me, taken away from me and given back to
me enough.”
The defendant described how he had prepared for the
killings by hiding his loaded SKS semi-automatic rifle behind a mattress
in his living quarters at the garage, locating Mr. Rhodes' home in
Spring Hill, and making five incendiary devices out of old oil filters.
The defendant recalled that he had planned to kill
his children, then travel to Spring Hill and use the incendiary devices
to firebomb Mr. Rhodes' residence, and then drive to Murfreesboro and
shoot Mr. Rhodes' young daughter, who would be at her mother's apartment
in the public housing project in Murfreesboro until the scheduled
custody change at the Sheriff's Department.
The defendant parked a car next to the back door of
his uncle's garage, headed in the direction he would need to travel, so
that he could quickly leave the garage after he killed his children and
commit the other criminal offenses.
The defendant recalled that, when he had picked up
the children, his former wife “was dressed nicely. She was wearing
makeup. She said she was happy. And that did not make me happy.” After
picking up the children at Wal Mart and taking them to McDonald's and
Funland, the defendant brought the children to his uncle's garage, where
they visited with him and played with some tools. The defendant noted
that he “had to play along to avoid any suspicion on the children's
part.”
Around 7 to 7:30 p.m. the defendant left four-year-old
Kayla and six-year-old Eric, who was hearing impaired, playing in the
front bay of the garage with a hammer and other tools so they would be
distracted and not hear the shots. The defendant then led twelve-year-old
Stephen and ten-year-old Brent to the rear bay where he lived and had
earlier hidden the SKS rifle. There he told the two older boys that he
“had something for them” and instructed them to close their eyes and
stand with their backs to him with Stephen, who was the taller, standing
directly in front of Brent. Telling the boys “don't peek,” the defendant
pulled out the SKS rifle, knelt down and aimed the rifle.
The defendant explained that he positioned the
children to enable him to pierce both of their hearts with a single shot.
With the barrel of the rifle touching Brent's back, he fired and then
shot the boys again to be sure they were dead. After hiding the boys'
bodies under a tarpaulin, the defendant brought Kayla and Eric to the
rear bay and told them he had “something for them.” When the children
inquired about their older brothers, the defendant did not respond.
Instead he positioned the taller Eric directly in
front of Kayla, placed their hands over their eyes, told them not to
peek, and knelt and fired the rifle into the two children. The defendant
said that he shot Kayla a second time before placing the bodies beside
the older children under the tarpaulin. The defendant told the police
that there was no enjoyment in killing the children.
The defendant recalled that he then straightened the
area, washed, and prepared to complete the next phase of his plan by
placing the re-loaded rifle and the firebombs in his car. After checking
to see if anyone could have seen him at the garage and listening to his
police scanner to see if anyone had reported gunshots, he left the
garage. However, when it became apparent that there was not enough time
to carry out his plan, he returned to the garage.
The defendant explained, “I planned a lot of
different scenarios and chose the one that time permitted. I was
constantly subtracting-going over what ... options ...-were left.” The
defendant further observed, “I had done what I wanted to do. I wanted to
shock [my ex-wife] to death. I was done. I was done.”
After considering suicide, he turned himself in to
the police. He explained to the police that he had decided not to kill
himself because someone who “was involved” should be left alive to help
people “have a chance of understanding this.” While professing love for
his children, the defendant told the police that he felt no regret or
remorse for killing them.
The defendant's account of the killings was supported
by physical evidence. For example, spent bullets and cartridges
recovered both from the victims' bodies and from the crime scene had
been fired from the SKS rifle found by the police. Gunshot residue was
found on the defendant's hands, and the children's blood was found on
his clothing.
Additionally, the results of the autopsies performed
by forensic pathologist Dr. Charles Harlan were consistent with the
defendant's story. Dr. Harlan testified that all four children died as
the result of multiple gunshot wounds to the chest and/or abdomen.
According to Dr. Harlan, the angle of the gunshot
wounds was consistent with someone kneeling behind the victims and
shooting upwards with the children standing in the positions described
by the defendant. Dr. Harlan also opined that some of Kayla's wounds
were consistent with someone shooting her from above as she lay on the
garage floor.
The defendant declined to testify in his own behalf,
but he offered the testimony of several witnesses, with the bulk of the
defense proof aimed at establishing the defendant's insanity or
diminished capacity and possible carbon monoxide poisoning.FN5 The
administrator of the Bedford County Jail testified that the defendant
was placed on suicide watch during the first week after his arrest. The
administrator noted that the defendant had been a quiet and cooperative
inmate.
FN5. The defendant also presented the testimony of
his parents' neighbor, who had known the defendant and his family in
1992; of a worker at a Murfreesboro liquor store, who described
purchases made by Mrs. Holton; and of a former ATF agent, who opined
that the “bomb” found at the garage would not have worked and was made
by someone who knew “nothing about how explosives work.”
The defendant's uncle, who owned the garage where the
killings occurred, testified that the defendant had lived in the rear
bay of the garage for the four months preceding the killings. He had
slept in an area draped with plastic tarpaulins at the back of the bay
and had used a propane heater to warm this enclosed area.
The defendant's uncle, who saw the defendant daily,
testified that, after he was unable to see his children, the defendant
became “quieter and withdrawn, unresponsive” and had less energy.
Nonetheless, on the day of the murder the defendant appeared very happy
to see his children.
The defendant's uncle recalled that the police
returned to the garage following the murders and reconstructed the
defendant's living quarters “better and tighter than it originally was”
and tested the propane heater inside the enclosed area. The temperature
outside on the day of the murders was between forty and fifty degrees
Fahrenheit, and the outside temperature was much colder at the time the
police reconstructed the living quarters and tested the heater.
Dr. Donna Seger, a toxicologist, testified that
carbon monoxide can affect memory, decrease IQ, and cause depression,
psychosis and neurologic deficit. Dr. Seger, however, had not examined
the defendant. Another witness, Dr. Leighton Sissom, a mechanical
engineer who had examined the propane heater and the defendant's living
quarters at the garage, testified that the ventilation of the area was
inadequate for safe use of the heater and that it was probable that
carbon monoxide had been present where the defendant slept.
However, Dr. Sissom could not state that the
defendant had been exposed to carbon monoxide on or before November 30,
1997, and conceded that the heater, when tested, was functioning
properly and did not emit a significant amount of carbon monoxide.
The defendant also introduced the deposition of Dr.
Howard S. Kirshner, a neurologist who had tested the defendant for
symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning. Dr. Kirshner described the
effects of carbon monoxide poisoning ranging from coma and death to
headaches, insomnia, problems with coordination, memory loss, and
irritability. According to Dr. Kirshner, the defendant had reported
experiencing headaches, irritability and sluggishness after purchasing
the propane heater in October 1997 and had also described memory loss
after the killings.
However, except for difficulty with the fine motor
coordination tests, the defendant performed normally on the tests
administered by Dr. Kirshner. Results of an MRI on the defendant's brain
were likewise normal, but Dr. Kirshner explained that changes to the
brain caused by carbon monoxide poisoning would not necessarily appear
on an MRI scan. Although the defendant's minor coordination problems
were consistent with carbon monoxide poisoning, Dr. Kirshner could not
diagnose the defendant with carbon monoxide poisoning.
Dr. Pamela Auble, a clinical neuropsychologist, also
testified for the defense. She had interviewed and tested the defendant
about six months after the offenses. Testing indicated that the
defendant's IQ was superior (120) but that he had experienced deficits
in processing information, in learning visual information, and in motor
speed and manual dexterity. The defendant also experienced difficulty
relating to people.
Dr. Auble opined that these test results were
consistent with exposure to carbon monoxide, although she was unable to
definitively conclude that the defendant had been exposed to carbon
monoxide. Rather, Dr. Auble opined that at the time these homicides were
committed the defendant had been suffering from major depression caused
by the termination of his marriage and “his concerns over [the] well-being
of his children.”
Dr. Auble conceded that the defendant had not been
depressed, anxious, or psychotic at the time of her June 1998 interview,
stating, “at the time I saw him as he said it, really he didn't have to
worry about his children anymore and how they were being taken care of.
In November of '97 that was a big concern for him.” In short, at the
time of Dr. Auble's interview, the defendant was “glad [his children]
were dead.”
Dr. William Kenner, a psychiatrist, testified that
the defendant had been suffering from major depression at the time he
killed his children. Dr. Kenner explained that a severely depressed
parent may believe that his life, as well as that of his children, is
worthless, and may kill his children to save them from the “terrible
fate” of living. Dr. Kenner opined that the defendant matched the
profile of a father who would kill his children, i.e., commit filicide,
and emphasized that “the more a parent loves his or her children, the
greater the risk is that they will kill them if they get severely
depressed.”
Dr. Kenner based his opinion that the defendant had
been suffering from major depression at the time of these killings upon
reports that the defendant had been unable to sleep at night, that he
had worked seven days a week except when he saw his children, that he
had lost interest in other activities, that he had difficulty thinking
and concentrating, that he had spoken slowly and stared into space, that
he had lost weight and withdrawn from human contact, and that, in the
month before the murder, the defendant had been found lying on the floor
for no reason and had expressed a desire to commit suicide.
Dr. Kenner believed that the defendant's depression
had been exacerbated by carbon monoxide poisoning, which had also made
the defendant more irritable. Dr. Kenner, however, conceded that a
person can suffer from major depression and still be capable of
distinguishing right from wrong. Indeed, Dr. Kenner acknowledged that
parents who commit filicide “know it's against the law but [typically
believe] it's done for almost the right reasons.”
The State's rebuttal proof consisted of the testimony
of Ralph Mosley, a safety consultant who had recreated the defendant's
living quarters in the rear bay under conditions similar to those
existing at the time of the killings in order to test for carbon
monoxide contamination. The test revealed no evidence of carbon monoxide.
The State also presented the testimony of Dr. Daniel
Martell, a forensic neuropsychologist, who had examined and tested the
defendant. Dr. Martell noted that the defendant had a history of
depression which was reflected in his medical and military records. Dr.
Martell opined that, at the time of the crime, the defendant had been
suffering from major depression, passive-aggressive personality disorder,
and a schizoid personality.
Dr. Martell explained that a person with a passive-aggressive
personality disorder acts out anger or hostility in passive ways and
that a person with a schizoid personality is a “loner,” someone who
isolates himself from others and has poor social skills. Dr. Martell
dismissed the theory of carbon monoxide poisoning based upon the
negative results of the tests performed by the safety consultant and the
results of psychological tests which were entirely consistent with
depression alone.
As a result of his examination, Dr. Martell concluded
that, despite his depression, the defendant knew the nature and the
consequences of his behavior and also knew that killing his children was
wrong.
Dr. Martell stated that the defendant's depression
did not preclude premeditation and pointed out that the defendant
admitted he had contemplated murdering his children for two years, that
the defendant had elaborately planned and prepared for the murders, that
the defendant had formulated “a time chart” of how the crimes would be
committed, that the defendant had targeted the hearts of the children,
wounds certain to cause death, that the defendant had concealed the
bodies and the murder weapon from view and washed the blood from his
body, and that the defendant had ultimately surrendered to the police,
the surrender itself an acknowledgment of wrongdoing.
As to Dr. Kenner's testimony that the defendant was
motivated by love for his children, Dr. Martell pointed out that the
defendant had planned and prepared to shoot Mr. Rhodes' daughter, to
whom he was not related, and had intended to fire bomb Mr. Rhodes' home.
Dr. Martell concluded that the defendant had been a
very angry person, that he had committed these homicides to cause pain
for his former wife and her new boyfriend, and that he had been capable
of distinguishing right from wrong and of appreciating the wrongfulness
of his conduct.
Based upon this proof, the jury found the defendant
guilty on all four counts of first degree premeditated murder.
B. Sentencing Phase
At the sentencing hearing the State sought to
establish two aggravating circumstances. With respect to all four
convictions, the State relied upon the “mass murder” aggravating
circumstance, “which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more
persons whether committed during a single episode or at different times
within a forty-eight-month period.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(12)
(1997).
With respect to the killings of ten-year-old Brent,
six-year-old Eric, and four-year-old Kayla Marie, the State sought to
establish that “the murder was committed against a person less than
twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of
age, or older.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(1) (1997).
The State relied upon the proof presented during the
guilt phase of the trial. The State also replayed the audiotape of the
defendant's November 30, 1997, confession that contained his date of
birth and re-introduced the February 27, 1996, custody order of the
Bedford County Juvenile Court that established the ages of the children.
Pursuant to the defendant's instructions, the
mitigation proof was limited to testimony by the jail administrator that
the defendant had been a good prisoner, that he had obeyed the rules,
performed assigned tasks well, and interacted well with the prison
staff. The administrator testified that the defendant was kept in
isolation but was regularly visited by his family.
The defendant did not dispute the applicability of
the aggravating circumstances but instead argued that the aggravating
circumstances did not outweigh the following mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant has no significant history
of prior criminal activity; (2) the murder was committed while the
appellant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance; (3) the murder was committed under circumstances that the
appellant reasonably believed to provide a moral justification for his
conduct; (4) the capacity of the appellant to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of a
mental disease or defect that was insufficient to establish a defense to
the crime but substantially affected his judgment; and (5) any other
mitigating circumstance raised by either the prosecution or the defense
during both the guilt/innocence phase of the trial and the sentencing
phase. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(j) (1997).
Based upon this proof, the jury imposed a sentence of
death for each conviction. The defendant appealed, challenging both his
convictions and sentences. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and
the case was docketed in this Court. We affirm.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the
convicting evidence. Specifically the defendant argues that the evidence
is insufficient to support the jury's finding of premeditation because
he had been suffering from severe depression at the time of the killings
that prevented the exercise of reflection and judgment.
The defendant declares that “[t]here is no way that a
person with the defendant's past record, including giving up a military
career for his children, could kill them after the exercise of
reflection and judgment.”
The defendant was convicted of four counts of first
degree murder-“[a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.”
Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1997). Intentional “refers to a person
who acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or to a
result of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-11-302(a) (1997).
A killing is premeditated if it is an act done after
the exercise of reflection and judgment. “Premeditation” means that the
intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not
necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused
for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at the
time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered
in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from
excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation. Tenn.Code Ann.
§ 39-13-202(d) (1997).
The proper inquiry for an appellate court reviewing a
sufficiency challenge is whether, considering the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781,
61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn.1999).
A verdict of guilt removes the presumption of
innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt, and on appeal the
defendant has the burden of illustrating why the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict rendered by the jury. State v.
Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 557-58 (Tenn.2000); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d
913, 914 (Tenn.1982). In contrast, the State on appeal is entitled to
the strongest legitimate view of the trial evidence and all reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. See Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d
at 557-58; Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 599.
Questions about the credibility of witnesses, the
weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised
by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, and this Court does
not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. Id. Nor may this Court
substitute inferences it draws from circumstantial evidence for those
drawn by the trier of fact. See Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 557-58; Liakas
v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 305, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956). The standard
of appellate review is the same whether the conviction is based upon
direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 111 (Tenn.1998).
Finally, Tennessee courts have identified several
circumstances that may be considered indicative of premeditation,
including: the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the
particular cruelty of the killing; declarations by the defendant of an
intent to kill; evidence of procurement of a weapon; preparations before
the killing for concealment of the crime, and calmness immediately after
the killing. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn.1997); see also
State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 492 (Tenn.2002).
Evaluating the proof in this record in accordance
with these standards we hold that the evidence clearly is sufficient to
support the defendant's convictions. The proof has been thoroughly
reviewed and need not be again recounted in detail. To summarize,
however, the record reflects that the defendant admitted that he had
contemplated and planned to murder his four young children. Indeed, the
defendant told the police that he had been thinking about killing his
children for two years.
The defendant explained that he definitively resolved
to kill his children after speaking with his former wife two days before
the killings occurred. The record reflects that the defendant formulated
the plan, that he concealed the loaded gun at the garage, that he called
his former wife to let her know that he would be taking the children by
the garage on the pretense of showing them a dog, that he lured the
children, two at a time, to the rear bay of the garage promising them a
surprise, that he positioned the children so that one shot would pierce
the hearts of both, that he gave the two younger children a drill and a
hammer to play with so they would be distracted and not hear their
brothers being shot, that he concealed the bodies of his older sons
before persuading the two younger children to come to the rear bay of
the garage, and that by killing the children he intended to “shock” his
ex-wife “to death” and to end the custody disputes, explaining that his
children had been “had been taken away from me and given back to me,
taken away from me and given back to me enough.”
The defendant also concealed the victim's bodies and
“squared away” the crime scene, prepared and planned to commit other
related crimes by locating the residence of his former wife, by
constructing homemade incendiary devices to firebomb that residence, and
by parking a vehicle in a way that would facilitate his ability to
commit all the crimes he had planned.
While all the mental health experts testified that
the defendant had been suffering from depression at the time he killed
his children, none testified that the depression rendered him incapable
of premeditation, of distinguishing right from wrong, or of appreciating
the wrongfulness of his conduct.
To the contrary, Dr. Martell opined that the
defendant had been capable of forming the requisite mental intent for
premeditated first degree murder and of distinguishing right from wrong
and of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. Dr. Auble agreed
that the defendant had been capable of appreciating the wrongfulness of
his conduct and of distinguishing right from wrong.
Furthermore, she conceded that the defendant had not
been depressed when she interviewed him some months after the killings
because he no longer had to worry about his children and that he was
“glad [his children] were dead.”
Finally, by explaining that he had killed his
children to end the custody dispute and to shock his former wife, the
defendant himself contradicted Dr. Kenner's opinion that the killings
were altruistic.
Furthermore, the defendant's behavior immediately
after the killings indicate that he was able to distinguish right from
wrong and to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Before leaving
the garage after the killings, the defendant listened to the police
scanner in his car to determine whether anyone had reported hearing
gunshots.
The defendant later surrendered to police, walking
into the sheriff's department and reporting a “homicide times four.”
Officers testified that the defendant appeared normal and calm, spoke in
a matter-of-fact tone, and never exhibited any bizarre behavior.
Indeed, the defendant warned one of the officers,
whom he had known for several years, of the homemade incendiary devices
in the garage. In sum, there is sufficient, indeed overwhelming,
evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict finding the
defendant guilty of four counts of premeditated first degree murder.
This issue is without merit.
* * *
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-206(c)(1) (1997)
mandates that this Court determine (1) whether the sentence of death was
imposed in any arbitrary fashion; (2) whether the evidence supports the
jury's finding of statutory aggravating circumstances; (3) whether the
evidence supports the jury's finding that aggravating circumstances
outweigh any mitigating circumstances; and (4) whether the sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant.
A thorough review of the record reveals that the
evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding of the aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. As to all four convictions of
first degree murder, the jury found that the defendant had committed
“mass murder,” “which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more
persons whether committed during a single episode or at different times
within a forty-eight-month period.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(12)
(1997). As to three of the convictions, the jury found that “the murder
was committed against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and
the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age, or older.” Tenn.Code Ann.
§ 39-13-204(i)(1) (1997).
The defendant did not contest the applicability of
these aggravating circumstances, both of which involve objective,
readily ascertainable facts. Furthermore, the evidence is sufficient to
support the jury's findings that the aggravating circumstances so found
outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, there is no indication that the sentences of death were
imposed in an arbitrary fashion.
Finally, the sentences of death in this case are not
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
the nature of the crime and the defendant Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (1997). A death sentence is disproportionate only if
“the case, taken as a whole, is plainly lacking in circumstances
consistent with those in similar cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 665.
A death sentence is not disproportionate merely
because the circumstances of the offense are similar to those of another
offense for which the defendant has received a life sentence. Id. Thus,
the duty of an appellate court is not to assure “that a sentence less
than death was never imposed in a case with similar characteristics,”
but instead to “assure that no aberrant death sentence is affirmed.” Id.
While there is no mathematical or scientific formula
involved in comparing similar cases, this Court generally considers: (1)
the means of death; (2) the manner of death; (3) the motivation for the
killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the similarity of the victim's
circumstances, including age, physical and mental conditions, and the
victim's treatment during the killing; (6) the absence or presence of
provocation; (7) the absence or presence of justification; and (8) the
injury to and effects on non-decedent victims. See Vann, 976 S.W.2d at
107 (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 667). When reviewing the
characteristics of the defendant, we consider: (1) the defendant's prior
record or prior criminal activity; (2) the defendant's age, race, and
gender; (3) the defendant's mental, emotional or physical condition; (4)
the defendant's involvement or role in the murder; (5) the defendant's
cooperation with authorities; (6) the defendant's remorse; (7) the
defendant's knowledge of the helplessness of the victim; and (8) the
defendant's capacity for rehabilitation. Id.
Moreover in conducting this review, “we select from
the pool of cases in which a capital sentencing hearing was actually
conducted to determine whether the sentence should be life imprisonment,
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or death.”
Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 570 (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 666).
Considering the record in this case in light of these
factors, the proof shows that the thirty-six-year-old, highly
intelligent white male defendant meticulously planned and carefully
premeditated the murders of his four young children. The defendant
admitted that his motivation was anger at his former wife for removing
the children from his custody and his desire to “shock” his former wife
“to death.”
To accomplish these murders, the defendant exploited
the trust and love of his children. He agreed to visit with them and
take them Christmas shopping. He enticed them to the back bay of the
garage on the pretense that he had a surprise for them, and used this
pretense to carefully position the children so that one shot would
pierce two hearts.
To fully ensure their death, the defendant repeatedly
shot the unarmed, unresisting children at close range with an SKS semi-automatic
rifle. While the mental health experts agreed that the defendant had
been depressed at the time he committed these crimes, there was no
evidence indicating that he was incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong or of appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Instead, the proof indicated that he methodically
devised a plan and carefully carried it out against the vulnerable,
unsuspecting victims, all the while realizing the consequences of his
actions. While the defendant told police he took no enjoyment from
committing these murders, he certainly expressed no remorse for his
actions, telling Dr. Auble several months later that he was “glad [his
children] were dead.”
Dr. Auble testified that the defendant had not been
suffering from depression when he made that comment. While there is no
evidence in the record regarding the defendant's amenability to
rehabilitation, the record reflects that the defendant had cooperated
with the police, confessing to the crimes and warning officers about the
homemade incendiary devices.
Furthermore, the jail administrator testified that
the defendant had caused no problems during his incarceration. While no
two capital cases and no two defendants are alike, the following cases
and defendants share several similarities with this case and this
defendant.
In State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn.1991), the
defendant shot and killed his girlfriend and her two daughters, nine and
six years old. The defendant was motivated by his anger at his
girlfriend's attempt to reconcile with her ex-husband, the father of her
children. The defendant had a prior conviction involving a shooting and
was on a weekend furlough from the Metropolitan Workhouse in Davidson
County when he committed these murders.
The defendant denied any involvement in the murders,
but he was convicted of first degree premeditated murder as to each
victim. The defendant presented the testimony of former teachers,
friends, and family members in mitigation. This testimony portrayed the
defendant as a good student, a good father, a good provider, a good
inmate, a responsible, polite, friendly, helpful, and nonviolent person
who had experienced a religious conversion while incarcerated.
Nevertheless, the jury imposed a death sentence for
the murder of the six-year-old child and sentences of life imprisonment
on the remaining convictions. In imposing the death sentence, the jury
relied upon five aggravating circumstances, including the young age of
the victim and the defendant's commission of mass murder. See Tenn.Code
Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(1), (2), (5), (6), (7), (12) (1989).
In State v. Oscar Franklin Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn.1993),
the jury imposed the death sentence upon the forty-year-old defendant
who shot and stabbed his estranged wife and his thirteen-and sixteen-year-old
stepsons. The murders were motivated by the defendant's anger at being
separated from his wife.
The defendant had previously assaulted the victims
and, as a result, was facing charges for aggravated assault at the time
he committed the murders. Witnesses testified that for several months
prior to the murder, the defendant had publicly plotted to kill the
victims. Expert testimony revealed that he mutilated two of the bodies
shortly after the victims' deaths.
The defendant denied his involvement in the murders.
Nevertheless, the jury found him guilty of first degree premeditated
murder as to each victim and imposed a sentence of death for each murder,
finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in
that it involved torture or depravity of mind, that the murder was
committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest or prosecution, that the
murders were committed during the perpetration of another felony, and
that the defendant had committed mass murder. See Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-13-204(i)(5), (6), (7), (12) (1989).
In State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn.2000), the
twenty-seven-year-old defendant was convicted of first degree murder
during the perpetration of a rape of his girlfriend's eight-year-old
daughter. In sentencing the defendant, the jury applied two aggravating
circumstances, including the young age of the victim, and the fact that
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it
involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to
produce death. Id. at 205; see Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(1), (5)
(1989).
The evidence established that the defendant raped the
child while choking her, possibly with a shoelace. Id. at 203-04. When
the child stopped breathing, the defendant threw her into a river. Id.
at 203. An autopsy revealed multiple scrapes and bruises to the child's
face and neck and a deep ligature mark around the front of her neck. Id.
at 204. The autopsy further indicated that the child was alive when she
was thrown into the river. Id.
The defendant was highly intelligent but was
suffering from attention deficit disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and serious depression. Id. Additionally, the defendant had
been sexually abused as a child. Id. at 205. The defendant had no prior
criminal record and demonstrated remorse following the offense. Id. at
221.
In State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93 (Tenn.1998), the
defendant was convicted of felony murder during the perpetration of a
rape of his eight-year-old daughter. The proof indicated that the
victim's death was the result of ligature strangulation. The jury
applied three aggravating circumstances in sentencing the defendant to
death: the young age of the victim, the defendant's prior convictions
for aggravated rape, and the fact that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse
beyond that necessary to produce death. See Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-13-204(i)(1), (2), (5) (1997).
Medical testimony indicated that the condition of the
victim's anus was consistent with ongoing, repeated anal penetration.
Witnesses testified that the defendant showed no remorse at the hospital
about his daughter's death, and nothing in the record indicated a
capacity for rehabilitation.
In State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1988), the
twenty-six-year-old defendant was babysitting a friend's children,
including the victim. The defendant raped the seven-year-old victim
vaginally and anally. The victim suffocated as the defendant held his
hand over her mouth to keep her from screaming. The defendant was
convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated rape.
Following a sentencing hearing, the jury found four
aggravating circumstances: the victim was less than twelve years of age;
the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it
involved torture or depravity of mind; the murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or
prosecution of the defendant or another; and the murder was committed
during the perpetration of a felony. See Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-2-203(i)(1),(5), (6), (7) (1982). The defendant had offered
mitigating evidence that he had been under the influence of marijuana or
alcohol at the time he committed the offense, and that he had a past
mental impairment.
In State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn.1983), the
defendant was a stranger to the eight-year-old victim. He lured her into
his car, drove to an isolated spot, and raped her. When Coe completed
the rape, the victim told him that Jesus loved him. At that point, the
defendant strangled the victim until she turned blue.
When the victim did not immediately die from the
strangulation, he stabbed her in the neck with a pocket knife and
watched as she suffered agonizing death throes. Eventually, he left her
to die in the wooded area. Coe was convicted of first degree murder,
kidnapping, and aggravated rape.
Following the sentencing hearing the jury sentenced
the defendant to death upon finding four aggravating circumstances: the
victim was not twelve years of age; the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind; the
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another;
and the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in
committing or attempting to commit rape. See Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-2-203(i)(1), (5),(6), (7) (1982). As mitigating evidence the
defendant claimed that he had been under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance at the time he committed the offense.
In State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn.1990), the
twenty-year-old defendant stabbed to death his girlfriend's twenty-eight-year-old
neighbor and the neighbor's two-year-old daughter. The jury imposed the
death penalty for each conviction, and as to the two-year-old child,
relied upon the age of the victim, the fact that the defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to two or more persons other than the
victim, and that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
in that it involved torture or depravity of mind. Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-2-203(i)(1), (3), & (5) (1982); see also State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d
516 (Tenn.2000) (imposing the death sentence based in part on the mass
murder aggravating circumstance where the defendants shot two men,
strangled the mother of one of the men, and buried all three victims
alive).
Like the present case, the defendant in each of these
cases murdered a minor, indeed in many instances a very young child. In
most of these cases, as in this case, the victim was either well-acquainted
with the defendant or related to the defendant. In many of these cases,
the jury relied upon the age of the victim aggravating circumstance, and
in two cases, the jury relied upon the mass murder aggravating
circumstance.
Unlike the present case, in many of these cases the
defendants denied involvement in the crime and presented extensive
mitigating proof. While no two capital cases are identical, we have
compared the circumstances of the present case with the circumstances of
the cases set out above and others not herein detailed and conclude that
this case, taken as a whole, is not plainly lacking in circumstances
consistent with other similar cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed. Thus, the defendant's sentences of death are not
disproportionate considering the circumstances of the crime and the
defendant.
VII. Conclusion
We have considered the entire record in this case and
find that the sentences of death were not imposed in any arbitrary
fashion, that the sentences of death are not excessive or
disproportionate, that the evidence supports the jury's finding of the
statutory aggravating circumstances and the jury's finding that these
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating factors beyond a
reasonable doubt. We have also considered all the defendant's
assignments of error and conclude that none has merit. With respect to
issues not specifically addressed herein, we affirm the decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals, authored by Judge Norma McGee Ogle and joined
in by Judge David H. Welles and Judge Jerry L. Smith. Relevant portions
of that opinion are published hereafter as an appendix.
The defendant's convictions and sentences are
affirmed. The sentences of death shall be carried out as provided by law
on the 3rd day of June, 2004, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or
other proper authority. It appearing that the defendant is indigent,
costs of this appeal are taxed to the State of Tennessee.
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., filed a concurring-dissenting
opinion.
