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Anthony Dewayne DOYLE

 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 

 
 
 
Classification: Murderer
Characteristics: Robbery
Number of victims: 1
Date of murder: January 16, 2003
Date of birth: October 16, 1984
Victim profile: Hyun Mi Cho, 37 (food delivery)
Method of murder: Beating with a baseball bat
Location: Rowlett, Dallas County, Texas, USA
Status: Sentenced to death on May 28, 2004. Executed by lethal injection on March 27, 2014
 
 
 
 
 
 
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The United States Court of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit

 

Anthony Dewayne Doyle v. William Stephens, Director

 
 
 
 
 
 

Name

TDCJ Number

Date of Birth

Doyle, Anthony Dewayne

999478

10/16/1984

Date Received

Age (when Received)

Education Level

05/28/2004

19

10

Date of Offense

Age (at the Offense)

County

01/16/2003

18

Dallas

Race

Gender

Hair Color

Black

Male

Black

Height

Weight

Eye Color

5' 07"

182

Brown

Native County

Native State

Prior Occupation

Dallas

Texas

Laborer

Prior Prison Record

None

Summary of incident


On January 16, 2003, in Dallas County, Texas, Doyle placed a phone order for food and requested delivery. 

Upon arrival, Doyle demanded money from the thirty-seven year old Asian female that was making the delivery. 

When the victim told Doyle that she did not have any money, he struck her in the head with a baseball bat, causing her death. 

Doyle then placed her body in a dumpster and fled in her vehicle.
 

Co-defendants

 None

Race and Gender of Victim

Asian/Female

 
 
 
 
 
 

Anthony Doyle was executed by lethal injection in Texas, USA, on March 27, 2014 for the robbery and murder of Hyun Mi Cho, 37.

 
 

Dallas-area man executed for delivery driver killing in Rowlett

The Associated Press - DallasNews.com

March 27, 2014

HUNTSVILLE — A Dallas-area man was executed Thursday evening in Texas for the robbery and slaying of a woman who was attacked while delivering food to his parents’ home 11 years ago.

Anthony Doyle, 29, was given a lethal injection for the 2003 death of Hyun Mi Cho, who was beaten with a baseball bat, then robbed of her car, cellphone and credit cards. Evidence showed Doyle ordered the doughnuts and breakfast tacos that the 37-year-old Cho delivered. He shared the food with friends after stuffing the woman’s body in a neighbor’s trash can in an alley behind the home in Rowlett, a suburb just east of Dallas.

Doyle shook his head and said nothing inside the death chamber in Huntsville when a warden asked if he had a statement to make. The prisoner’s eyes closed as the sedative pentobarbital was injected. He took a few breaths, then began to snore quietly. Soon, he stopped moving.

He was pronounced dead 25 minutes later, at 6:49 p.m.

No one from Cho’s family attended the execution, but two witnesses picked by Doyle — a friend and a spiritual adviser — watched as he was put to death.

Doyle became the fourth Texas inmate executed this year and the last before the state — the nation’s most active when it comes to capital punishment — begins using a new batch of pentobarbital obtained through a different pharmacy.

Prison officials have refused to reveal the source of the replenished stockpile, arguing the information must be kept secret to protect the supplier’s safety. But a judge Thursday ordered them to disclose the supplier to attorneys for two inmates set to be executed next month. The attorneys filed a lawsuit Wednesday seeking an emergency order requiring state authorities to identify the drug provider and results of tests of its potency and purity.

The prison agency plans to appeal the judge’s order.

About two hours before Doyle was put to death, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a last-day appeal to block his execution. Doyle’s attorney had called for his execution to be delayed, but not over the drug issue. The lawyer said Doyle deserved a new punishment hearing because jurors at his 2004 capital murder trial were given unknowingly false evidence about Doyle’s inability to be rehabilitated while he was confined at a juvenile detention facility for his delinquent behavior years before Cho’s slaying.

Cho, from South Korea, had been in the U.S. about two years when she was killed. Her sister has said Cho was earning money to care for her ill parents.

Police already had been searching for her after she didn’t return from the delivery Jan. 16, 2003, and began canvassing homes in the area after a neighbor discovered her body in his trash can.

When officers visited the home of Doyle’s parents, his sister told them about a wet brown spot on a carpet. Police then found blood spatter on the ceiling and kitchen walls and a strong odor of bleach and fresh paint. Evidence showed Doyle used barbecue sauce in an attempt to cover the blood and tried to clean the scene and repaint walls.

He was arrested at a friend’s home in Dallas. He later told investigators he was under pressure from his girlfriend and others to support his 3-week-old daughter and couldn’t get a job. He gave police a 10-page written confession.

 
 

Texas killer, 29, executed for robbing and beating delivery woman to death in 2003 after she brought him doughnuts

  • Anthony Doyle, 29, chose not to give a final statement before he was given the lethal injection in Huntsville on Thursday

  • He took a few breaths and started snoring before he was pronounced dead

  • Doyle beat Hyun Mi Cho, 37, to death after he ordered doughnuts and breakfast tacos to his parents' Dallas-area home in January 2003

  • He dumped her body in a trash can and stole her car and credit cards

  • His attorneys had tried to get him a new punishment by arguing that, despite earlier testimony, he could have been rehabilitated

  • Doyle became the fourth Texas inmate to be executed this year

By Lydia Warren - DailyMail.co.uk

March 27, 2014

A Texas man has been put to death 11 years after robbing and fatally beating a delivery woman who had brought him doughnuts.

Anthony Doyle, 29, was given a lethal injection on Thursday for the death of Hyun Mi Cho, 37, who he beat with a baseball bat before stealing her car, phone and credit cards in Rowlett in 2003.

After the injection, Doyle took a few breaths and began to snore quietly before he stopped moving, the Dallas Morning News reported. He was pronounced dead 25 minutes later, at 6.49pm.

Doyle did not make a statement before his death, a Department of Criminal Justice spokesman said. Texas ended its tradition of preparing a requested last meal for death row inmates in 2011.

No one from Cho's family attended the execution, but a friend of Doyle's and spiritual adviser he had picked were present.

His execution came more than 11 years after Cho, a South Korea native, was killed while trying to earn money to care for her ill parents back home.

She was delivering an order of doughnuts and breakfast tacos to Doyle's parents' home when she was attacked by the then 18-year-old.

When placing the food order, the caller had apparently faked an elderly woman's voice and Cho was wary, but had delivered to the address before.

But when she arrived, Doyle answered the door and invited her inside before demanding her money.

Responding that she had none, Cho was attacked with a baseball bat and her body was dumped in a trash can in an alley. Doyle then shared the food with friends.

A neighbor taking out garbage discovered Cho's body.

Police were already looking for her when she was found, and Doyle's sister told officers that she had found a brown spot on a carpet at her parents' house.

Investigators found blood splatters on the ceiling and kitchen walls, and learned that Doyle had used barbecue sauce to try to cover the blood. He then tried to clean the scene and repaint the walls.

Doyle, who was also seen driving Cho's car and trying to use her credit cards, was arrested at a friend's home in Dallas, then gave police a 10-page written confession.

He told investigators he was under pressure from parents and his girlfriend to support his three-week-old daughter, but that he was unable to get a job.

In an attempt to stop his execution, Doyle's attorney had argued that he deserved a new punishment hearing because jurors at his trial were presented with false evidence that was unknowingly false about his inability to be rehabilitated.

Attorney Lydia Brandt had argued the defunct Texas Youth Commission, a military-style juvenile boot camp where Doyle was sent, wasn't capable of delivering adequate rehabilitation. The boot camp model designed to 'break behavior' is now prohibited after abuses were exposed.

She argued that it was unlikely that Doyle would be sentenced to death if he were on trial today, but prosecutors argued that Doyle had struggled with discipline for years.

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected a last-day appeal to block Doyle's execution. He was the fourth person executed in the state this year and the 512th in Texas since the death penalty was reinstated.

Texas, which has executed more people than any other state since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, obtained a fresh batch of its execution drug, pentobarbital, the Department of Criminal Justice said this month, without revealing the source.

On Thursday, a state judge ordered Texas to release the name of its new drug supplier and the state attorney general's office said it would appeal the ruling.

Other U.S. states have been struggling to obtain the drugs after pharmaceutical firms, mostly in Europe, imposed sales bans because they object to having medications used in lethal injections.

Oklahoma has had to postpone two executions planned for this month because it could not find drugs. Alabama said this week it has run out of one of the main drugs it uses, stalling 16 executions.

Texas plans to execute five more inmates before the end of May - around the same number as every other state combined, according to the Death Penalty Information Center.

But overall, executions have been on the decline in Texas, after hitting a peak of 40 in 2000. Since 2010, Texas has averaged about 15 executions a year, Reuters reported.

The drop is due to the high costs of prosecutions and the availability of a sentence of life without parole. In recent years, there have been 10 or less.

'We are now very selective in what we choose to go after as death penalty cases, instead of deciding that every single murder that we try will be a capital case,' Susan Reed, the district attorney in San Antonio and a death penalty supporter, told Reuters.

 
 

In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

No. AP-74,960

Anthony Doyle, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas

On Direct Appeal from Dallas County

Holcomb, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Keller, P.J., Meyers, Price, Johnson, Keasler, and Cochran, J.J., join. Womack and Hervey, J.J., concur in the result.

O P I N I O N

In May 2004, appellant was convicted of capital murder. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a). Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Art. 37.071, § 2(g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.071, § 2(h). Appellant raises eleven points of error. We will affirm.

CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE

In his first and second points of error, appellant claims that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of veniremembers Gary Allen and Teresa Goldsmith. Appellant alleges that Allen was challengeable for cause because he could not consider the full range of punishment for the lesser-included offense of murder. Art. 35.16 (c)(2). Appellant alleges that Goldsmith was challengeable for cause because she had a bias or prejudice against the defendant because of her "inflammatory life experience." Art. 35.16 (a)(9).

To preserve error for a trial court's erroneous denial of a challenge for cause, appellant must show that: (1) he asserted a clear and specific challenge for cause; (2) he used a peremptory challenge on the complained-of veniremember; (3) all of his peremptory challenges were exhausted; (4) his request for additional strikes was denied; and, (5) an objectionable juror sat on the jury. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997). Appellant has properly preserved error with respect to each of the challenged veniremembers.

If a defendant establishes error, harm is shown when he has used a peremptory challenge to remove a veniremember and thereafter suffered a detriment because of the loss of that strike. Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987). Appellant exhausted all of his fifteen peremptory challenges granted by statute and requested additional peremptory challenges, but that request was denied.

When reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a challenge for cause, we look at the entire record to determine if there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We give great deference to the trial court's decision because the trial judge is present to observe the demeanor and tone of voice of the venireperson. Id. When a veniremember's answers are vacillating, unclear, or contradictory, we accord particular deference to the trial court's decision. Id.

Veniremember Allen

Appellant argues that Allen was unable to consider the full range of punishment for the lesser-included offense of murder. He asserts that Allen testified that he would be unable to give probation for murder but could give it for manslaughter. When he was first questioned by the prosecutor, Allen indicated that he could consider the full range of punishment, including probation, for the lesser-included offense of murder. He agreed that he would keep an open mind while hearing the evidence and that he would give probation in a case where it was appropriate.

When defense counsel questioned Allen about this issue, the following exchange occurred:

Q. How do you feel about the possibility of considering and having to give, if you thought it was appropriate under the circumstances, punishment as low as five years' probation?

A. It seems pretty low for a life. If you're considering, you know, a probation sentence for the proven death of someone, yeah, I think that's pretty low.

Q. I understand what you're saying. A lot of times, we'll have a lot of jurors come in and say, you know what, to be real honest with you and be true to my oath and tell the truth, I can't consider that. I can't consider to give that. In a murder case, I couldn't ever consider and give five years' probation, even if the facts -- if I thought the facts deserved it, I just couldn't do it because we're talking about the loss of a human life. How do you feel about that?

A. I agree with that.

Q. You just don't think you could do it, or you think you could do it?

A. I don't think I would feel right about probation for a life, no.

Q. Well, like I said, there are a lot of jurors who tell us that. They say being honest with you and true to my oath, if we're talking about a murder case, it doesn't matter to me if the person's never been convicted of a felony before, I just don't think I could ever give a probated sentence. Is that how you feel?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you feel pretty strongly about that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Okay.

A. It's almost like saying the first one is free, you know, if you kill someone in my personal opinion.

Q. Can I talk you out of that, or do you fell pretty strong about that?

A. I feel pretty strong about that.

* * *

Q. You think you could [give probation] for aggravated robbery?

A. Yes.

Q. But you just don't think you could do it for a murder offense?

A. Right.

The trial judge later explained the range of punishment applicable to capital murder cases. He explained that if a defendant has never been convicted of a felony offense before, the available punishment range could be anywhere from probation for up to ten years to life in the penitentiary, and a fine not exceeding $10,000. When asked if he could consider the entire punishment range, Allen answered: "I could. Is that including like manslaughter?" The trial judge explained that the range is applied to knowing as well as intentional murders. The trial judge then asked Allen if he could consider the applicable punishment range in the following exchange:

Q. The ultimate decision is left to the jury. Therefore, you have to be able to consider the full range of punishment.

Is that something you could do, or is that something you could not do?

A. I think I could.

Q. Okay. You could keep your mind open and fairly consider any potential punishment range that could come up before you?

A. Yes.

Defense counsel challenged Allen for cause, stating that Allen's responses indicated that he could not consider a probated sentence for murder but only for manslaughter. The trial judge denied the challenge for cause. The trial court's ruling is supported by the record. Allen ultimately agreed that he could consider the full range of punishment applicable to the case, including probation, when the trial judge explained the law to him.

Veniremember Goldsmith

Appellant argues that Goldsmith's "life experiences" were so inflammatory that she could not set them aside and judge the facts fairly and impartially. The "life experiences" in question were that Goldsmith's grandfather had been the victim in a capital murder case, that Goldsmith's mother had suffered a "near nervous breakdown" because of that murder, and that Goldsmith's father had witnessed the defendant's execution.

When she was first questioned by the prosecutor, Goldsmith acknowledged that the information she had provided in her questionnaire, that her grandfather had been a victim in a capital murder case, was accurate. When asked if she could put that experience aside and base this case on the evidence, Goldsmith answered, "Yes." The prosecutor later questioned her further on the issue:

Q. I asked you, you know, could you put that aside and judge this case.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And I just want to make sure, because I know it is a tough thing to have a victim in the family. And I'm not sure how long ago that happened, but the law is going to require you to set any personal feelings aside and then look at just the evidence on this case and decide if this person is guilty of this crime. And then, of course, on the punishment, decide death or life, or answer these questions based on the evidence you hear in the courtroom. Is that something you feel comfortable with?

A. Yes, I do, because I've spent a lot of time trying to reconcile the fall out from my grandfather's murder and have done a lot of reading and have tried to understand from someone's point of view who has committed murder. And I think I've looked at both sides.

Q. And you think that - -

A. I think I could be objective.

Q. And you could sit as a juror in this type of case?

A. I believe so.

Defense counsel then asked Goldsmith about the details underlying her grandfather's murder. Goldsmith explained that the murder took place when she was three years old and that she did not remember much from that time. She explained that her maternal grandfather, who owned a liquor store, had been shot in a robbery of that store and the shooter received the death penalty. She explained her mother was thirty-three years old at the time and had experienced a "near nervous breakdown" because of the murder. She further explained that her father had witnessed the killer's execution.

When further questioned on this issue, Goldsmith still maintained that she could be a fair juror and impartial in judging the case:

Q. Some people would say, you know, I'm past that. I can be a fair juror. You've said I think I can, and I've got to press you a bit harder here, obviously. I have to know. Can you do it or can you not do it as far as being fair and impartial in judging this case and this case alone, or will that be a problem for you?

A. Well, of course, it won't be easy. I could do it because I do believe in forgiveness and the basic goodness of man.

Q. Okay. And that's - - you know, we hope everybody feels that way. Sometimes people in your situation don't feel that way.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And I - - you know, I appreciate you being candid and telling us about it. But my main concern is this, this type offense is almost- - - no, it's not. I can't say its identical, but it has the same elements as murder plus robbery.

A. Right.

Q. [G]iven the fact, the elements in the indictment are similar to what happened with your grandfather, do you feel like that because of that, that could cause a problem for you? I mean, you say I think I can, I believe I can. But can you tell me today, yes, I can, or can you only say, I'm not sure?

A. I can.

Q. Okay. You think you can?

A. (Nods head.)

Q. Can you say yes or no?

A. Yes, I can.

Goldsmith unequivocally stated that she could put the experience of her grandfather's capital murder aside and could be fair and impartial in judging the case. Appellant has not shown that Goldsmith had a bias that would substantially impair her ability to carry out her oath and instructions in accordance with law. Feldman, 71 S.W.3d at 744. Appellant's first and second points of error are overruled.

CONSTITUTIONALITY AND RELATED ISSUES

In his third point of error, appellant claims that the lethal injection as it is currently administered in Texas violates the Eighth Amendment because it produces unnecessary pain, torture, and lingering death. Appellant raised this issue in a motion to set aside the indictment, but he failed to provide any evidence or further argument on the motion at trial. We have previously concluded that we cannot address this type of claim when the record is not sufficiently developed. Bible v. State, 162 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We decline to reconsider our holding in Bible.

Even if appellant's trial record had been fully developed, we still cannot address appellant's claim because it is not ripe for review on direct appeal. In Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), appellant claimed that his sentence was unconstitutional because he was mentally ill. We held that because appellant's execution was not imminent, his claim was not ripe for review. We noted that the fact that the appellant had a mental illness when he was tried and sentenced was not determinative of whether he will have a mental illness at the moment of his execution. Similarly, the method in which the lethal injection is currently administered is not determinative of the way it will be administered at the moment of appellant's execution. Thus, appellant's claim is not ripe for review. Appellant's third point of error is overruled.

In his fourth point of error, appellant claims that the administration of the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it is contrary to our "evolving standards of decency." Appellant claims that the fact that innocent people who were subsequently exonerated have been sentenced to death makes the death penalty an unconstitutional form of punishment, per se. While the execution of an innocent person would violate federal due process and be considered cruel and unusual punishment, appellant does not claim that he is innocent or that he will be exonerated. He therefore fails to demonstrate that his due process rights or his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has been violated. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Appellant's fourth point of error is overruled.

In his fifth through eleventh points of error, appellant makes various claims challenging the validity of the Texas death-penalty scheme. In his fifth point of error, appellant claims that "[t]he trial court erred when it relieved the state of its constitutional burden to prove insufficient mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt." He argues that the death penalty scheme violates the United States Constitution because it does not require the State to prove the mitigation special issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant cites to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2440 (2002), and Blakey v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). In his sixth point of error, appellant claims that the "12/10 rule" of the mitigation special issue violates various provision of the United States Constitution. In his seventh point of error, appellant claims that the death penalty statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to define "probability of committing future criminal acts of violence" in the future dangerous special issue. In his eighth point of error, appellant claims that the death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because its definition of mitigating evidence limits the factors that jurors are to consider when answering the mitigation question, citing Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004). In his ninth point of error, appellant claims that the death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it does not require the jury to consider evidence of mitigation. In his tenth point of error, appellant claims that the death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it provides the exact type of unfettered discretion prohibited in Furman v. Georgia. In his eleventh point of error, appellant claims that the death penalty scheme is unconstitutional for its failure to provide "meaningful appellate review."

This Court has previously rejected all of these claims, and appellant gives us no reason to revisit these issues here. See Perry v. State, 158 S.W. 3d 438, 446-7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 416 (2005); Blue v. State, 125 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 853 (2004); Ladd v. State, 3 S.W. 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert denied, 529 U.S. 1070 (2000); Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1697 (2005); Williams v. State, 692 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Appellant's fifth through eleventh points of error are overruled.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DELIVERED MAY 10, 2006.

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Articles refer to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

 

 

 
 
 
 
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